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Preface
the Climate Council is an independent, non-profit organisation, funded 
by donations from the public. Our mission is to provide authoritative, 
expert information to the australian public on climate change. 
halfway through the Critical Decade for climate action and four years after 
the Climate Commission released its report, ‘Critical Decade: Climate science, 
risks and responses’, this latest Climate Council report provides an update 
of climate change science, impacts and risks. This report draws from the 
massive body of evidence that human activities - primarily from the burning 
of coal, oil and gas - are driving dramatic changes in our climate system. The 
report outlines how the changing climate poses substantial and escalating 
risks for health, property, infrastructure, agriculture and natural ecosystems 
in Australia. Compared to our understanding when the last Critical Decade 
report was published, the risks of climate change for our well-being now 
look more serious at lower levels of climate change, strengthening the case 
for urgent action. Finally, the report describes why it is in Australia’s national 
interest to play a leadership role in the global move for strong climate action 
leading up to the Paris climate conference at the end of 2015. 
The Climate Council is extremely grateful to our team of reviewers whose 
comments and suggestions improved the report. The reviewers were: Prof. 
Jon Barnett (University of Melbourne), Dr linda Beaumont (Macquarie 
University), Dr elizabeth hanna (Australian national University), Prof. David 
karoly (University of Melbourne), and Prof. Barbara norman (University 
of Canberra). We also appreciate the invaluable contributions of several 
anonymous reviewers. This report was also made possible thanks to the 
efforts of Climate Council research volunteers, Zak Ballie, lily Barnett and 
Max newman. 
The authors retain sole responsibility for the content of this report. 
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Our understanding of 
climate change continues to 
strengthen, with dramatic 
changes of the climate system 
happening across the globe.
 › it is beyond doubt that human 
activities, primarily the 
emission of greenhouse gases 
from the combustion of fossil 
fuels like coal, oil and gas, are 
driving the dramatic changes of 
the climate system.
 › Climate change is increasing 
the frequency and severity of 
many extreme weather events, 
including heatwaves and 
extreme bushfire conditions.
 › hot days have doubled in the 
last 50 years, while heatwaves 
have become hotter, last longer 
and occur more often.
 › over the last 30 years extreme 
fire weather has increased in 
the populous southeast region 
of Australia - southern nsW, 
Victoria, Tasmania and parts of 
south Australia.
 › extreme sea-level events  
have tripled at sydney and 
Fremantle since the middle  
of the 20th century.
The changing climate poses 
substantial and escalating 
risks for health, property, 
infrastructure, agriculture and 
natural ecosystems.
 › Further increases in extreme 
heat in Australia are likely with 
more frequent and more intense 
hot days and longer and more 
severe heatwaves. Deaths from 
heatwaves are projected to 
double over the next 40 years in 
Australian cities. 
 › More than $226 billion in 
commercial, industrial, road, rail 
and residential assets around 
Australian coasts, most of them 
in urban areas, are potentially 
exposed to flooding and erosion 
hazards at a sea-level rise of 1.1 m.
 › From 2020 onwards, the 
predicted increase in drought 
frequency is estimated to cost 
$7.3 billion annually, reducing 
GDP by 1% per year.
 › if global temperatures reach 
3°C above pre-industrial levels, 
an estimated 8.5% of species 
globally are at risk of extinction, 
and under a “business as usual” 
scenario, leading to global 
warming of 4°C or more, a 
staggering one in six species 
could be lost.
Key Findings
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key findings
The risks of climate change 
for our well-being now look 
more serious at lower levels of 
climate change, strengthening 
the case for urgent action.
 › Changes in the climate  
system are occurring more 
rapidly than previously 
projected with larger and 
more damaging impacts now 
observed at lower temperatures 
than previously estimated.
 › The scientific underpinning 
for the 2°C policy target being 
a “safe” level of climate change 
is now weaker than it was a 
decade ago. The scientific 
case for a 1.5°C limit is more 
consistent with our current level 
of understanding, bolstering the 
case for even more urgent action. 
 › As the global average 
temperature rises further 
above the pre-industrial level, 
so does the risk of crossing 
thresholds or tipping points 
in the climate system, such as 
the loss of the Greenland ice 
sheet, the partial conversion 
of the Amazon rainforest to a 
savanna or grassland, and the 
large-scale emission of carbon 
dioxide (Co2) and methane from 
thawing permafrost. Crossing 
these thresholds would cause 
further disruptions to the 
climate system, with potentially 
catastrophic knock-on effects 
for human societies.
The action we take in the next 
five years will largely determine 
the severity of climate change 
and its long-term impact on 
human societies. While action 
is building worldwide, Australia 
is lagging behind.
 › it is in Australia’s national 
interest to tackle climate 
change, as a country on the 
front line of climate change 
impacts and as one of the 
world’s largest per capita 
emitters of greenhouse gases.
 › There is growing global action 
to tackle climate change with 
the rapid uptake of solutions, 
such as renewable energy, and 
countries are pledging stronger 
emissions reduction targets.
 › Australia is out of step with the 
rest of the developed world in 
climate action; by any indicator 
used to measure level of effort, 
Australia is at or near the 
bottom of the list of developed 
countries.
 › A very strong and rapid 
decarbonisation of the global 
economy could stabilise the 
climate system below 2°C, while 
a business-as-usual scenario 
could lead to temperature rises 
of 4°C or above by the end of 
the century, threatening the 
viability of modern society.
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1. Introduction
Four years ago, the Climate 
Commission released a major report, 
The Critical Decade: Climate science, 
risks and responses. The report, 
a comprehensive synthesis of the 
most recent climate change science, 
received significant traction in 
Australia and overseas. The phrase, 
‘the Critical Decade’, has become 
the defining mantra for what is now 
the Climate Council, emphasising 
the clear imperative of significant 
Australian and global action this 
decade to tackle climate change.
As world leaders prepare to meet in Paris 
later this year to negotiate a new climate 
agreement, this update of the landmark 
Critical Decade report provides an up-to-date 
synthesis of climate change science. The 
result is an even stronger basis for action for 
our leaders, as the evidence that our climate 
system is changing because of human 
activities is stronger than ever before.
The climate change landscape today stands 
in stark contrast to where it stood four years 
ago. halfway through the Critical Decade, 
many consequences of climate change 
are already evident, and the risks posed by 
further climate change are better understood. 
it is clear that global society must almost 
completely decarbonise in the next 30-35 
years, or sooner if possible, to tackle the 
climate change challenge effectively. This 
means that the vast majority of fossil fuels 
must stay in the ground 
The more we learn about climate change, 
the riskier it looks. A 2°C rise in temperature 
above pre-industrial levels has been 
established as a policy target, but this level 
of warming may already drive significant 
impacts. As scientific knowledge improves, 
it is becoming clear that risks previously 
considered to lie only above 2°C may well 
occur at lower temperatures. 
With just 0.85°C of warming globally we have 
already witnessed adverse consequences. 
in Australia the incidence of extreme 
temperatures has increased markedly over the 
last 50 years, while heatwaves have become 
hotter, are lasting longer and occur more 
often. Ground-breaking scientific research 
that can now tell us how much influence 
climate change has on a single heatwave or 
heat record has shown that many of the most 
extreme weather events, such as Australia’s 
record hot year in 2013, were virtually 
impossible without climate change.
1 Climate Change 2015: 
GrowinG risks, CritiCal ChoiCes
The decisions we make 
in the next five years 
will largely determine 
the severity of climate 
change our children 
and grandchildren will 
experience.
introduction
Projections of the escalating risks of climate 
change under a business-as-usual, high 
emissions scenario are becoming more 
reliable and more disturbing. More extreme 
heat is virtually certain across the continent, 
and southern and eastern Australia will 
experience harsher fire weather. extreme 
rainfall will likely become even more intense. 
Time in drought is projected to increase in 
southern Australia, with a greater frequency of 
severe droughts. Coastal flooding is very likely 
to increase as sea level rises at an increasing 
rate. But this future can be avoided.
While our understanding of climate change 
and the risks of a high emissions future have 
increased, so too has the range of solutions 
to the problem. not only are these solutions 
more feasible and less costly than ever before, 
some are already being implemented. in fact, 
we can already envisage a low or no-carbon 
future that is healthier, more resilient, more 
equitable, and more economically viable than 
a business-as-usual future.
The constraints to moving to this future are 
no longer technological or economic. They 
are political, institutional and ideological 
(based on belief systems). The rest of the 
world is now moving seriously on climate 
change and Australia is being left behind. 
Australia must cut its greenhouse gas 
emissions much more deeply and rapidly 
to contribute its fair share in meeting the 
climate change challenge. The government 
has recently announced that Australia’s 
goal will be to cut emissions by 26-28% 
compared to 2005 levels, by 2030. This is 
considerably less ambitious than the targets 
recommended by the Climate Change 
Authority (CCA), advising Australia’s post-
2020 target should include: (i) a 2025 target of 
a 30% reduction in its emissions below 2000 
levels (or a 36% reduction if the government 
opts for 2005 as its preferred base year); 
and (ii) further reductions within a range 
of 40 to 60% below 2000 levels by 2030 (or a 
range of approximately 45 to 65% below 2005 
levels). it is important to note that the CCA’s 
recommendations are based on a two-thirds 
chance of avoiding 2°C warming. For a 
stronger chance, the target should be greater 
emission reductions. Therefore, if global 
average temperature is to stay below 2°C then 
the CCA recommendations should be seen as 
a bare minimum for Australia’s contribution 
to tackling climate change in concert with 
the rest of the world.
The scientific basis for urgent action is set out 
clearly in this report. The decisions we make 
in the next five years, particularly decisions 
about long-term investments in energy, 
transport and built infrastructure, will largely 
determine the severity of climate change our 
children and grandchildren will experience. 
Failing to take sufficient action entails 
potentially catastrophic risks to our economy, 
environment, society and health. This is the 
critical decade for action and Australia must 
join the rest of the world in making deep 
and rapid cuts to our emissions if we are to 
protect our way of life into the future.
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The constraints to moving to a low 
or no-carbon future are no longer 
technological or economic. They are 
political, institutional and ideological.
2. The sCienCe 
oF CliMATe 
ChAnGe
The scientific understanding 
of climate change - its causes, 
consequences and future 
projections - provides the 
underpinning for assessing the 
risks posed to our well-being 
and provides guidance as to the 
magnitude and rate of actions 
required. Our understanding of 
climate change has advanced 
enormously over the past decade. 
The most recent assessment by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), published 
as a series of reports in 2013 and 
2014, provides even stronger 
evidence than ever before that 
significant changes to the climate 
system have already occurred, 
with significant consequences 
for our health, communities, 
infrastructure, economy, 
livelihoods, and environment.
in early 2015, Csiro and the Bureau of 
Meteorology published a comprehensive 
update on the scientific understanding of 
climate change in Australia – the nature 
of Australia’s climate and its variability, 
observations of changes in our climate over 
the last century, the influence of human-
driven climate change on these climatic 
shifts, and projections of further change over 
the rest of this century (Csiro and BoM 2015). 
it has been well established for nearly two 
decades that human activities, primarily 
the emission of greenhouse gases from the 
combustion of fossil fuels – coal, oil and 
gas - are driving the changes of the climate 
system observed since the mid-20th century. 
The fundamental physics of the greenhouse 
effect has been known for nearly two 
centuries, the observations of a changing 
climate confirm this understanding, and 
our capability to model the nature and 
magnitude of the human influence on 
climate has become more sophisticated and 
reliable (iPCC 2013). our ability to project 
future changes in climate – increases in 
temperature, changes in precipitation, sea-
level rise and the increase in the frequency 
and intensity of many extreme weather 
events – has improved markedly over the 
past decade or two. 
recent science provides even 
stronger evidence for significant 
changes to the climate system.
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This brief overview of the science of climate 
change focuses on the major features of 
the climate that are changing as a result of 
human activities: land and ocean warming, 
changing rainfall patterns, sea-level rise 
and melting of the ice, snow and frozen 
soil. The influence of climate change on 
extreme weather events is also included, as 
this knowledge is crucial for understanding 
the risks that climate change poses for our 
well-being (section 3). Unless otherwise 
stated, the source for the information at the 
global level is the iPCC Fifth Assessment 
report (iPCC 2013) and references therein, 
and at the Australian level the Csiro and 
BoM report “Climate Change in Australia: 
Projections for Australia’s nrM (natural 
resource Management) regions” (Csiro 
and BoM 2015) and references therein. 
These reports, along with the Australian 
Academy of science report “The science of 
climate change: Questions and answers”, 
are excellent sources for more detailed 
information on climate change science.
it has been well established that the 
burning of fossil fuels – coal, oil and gas - 
is driving the changes in the climate.
Figure 1: smokestacks in Alberta, Canada. Major features of the climate are changing as a result of human activities. 
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The 1980s, 1990s and 
2000s were all hotter 
than any other decade 
in recorded history.
2.1 Warming of the  
 Earth’s Surface
A commonly used indicator for 
climate monitoring purposes is the 
globally averaged combined land 
and ocean surface temperature, 
shown in Figure 3 (top panel). While 
there is considerable variability 
from year-to-year, there is a clear 
warming trend since the middle of 
the 20th century. Over the period 
1880 to 2012, the average surface 
temperature has risen by 0.85°C, 
with much of that warming 
occurring since about 1970. 2014 
was the hottest year on record. It 
Figure 2: A floodway shimmers in the heat in Ashburton, Western Australia. 
was also the 38th year in a row that 
the global average temperature was 
hotter than the 20th century average 
(NOAA 2015).
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The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows this 
warming trend as decadal averages, which 
remove much of the short-term variability. 
The 1990s were warmer than the 1980s and 
the 2000s were warmer than the 1990s. 
All three decades were hotter than any 
preceding decade since 1850. A comparison 
of these recent trends to palaeo-climatic 
records indicates it is likely that the 1983-
2012 period was the warmest 30-year period 
during the last 1400 years in the northern 
hemisphere, where longer and more 
extensive temperature data exist.
Figure 3: observed global mean combined land and ocean surface temperature anomalies, from 1850 to 2012 from three data 
sets. Top panel: annual mean values: Bottom panel: decadal mean values including the estimate of uncertainty for one data 
set (black). Anomalies are relative to the mean of 1961-1990. Source: iPCC 2013.
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Average surface temperature over the 
Australian continent has increased by 
0.9°C since 1910, with higher increases in 
night-time minimum temperatures than in 
daytime maximum temperature. Figure 4 
shows that this warming trend is apparent in 
all states and territories. 2013 was Australia’s 
warmest year on record.
Figure 4: Warming is apparent in all states and territories. linear trend in Australian mean temperature from the Australian 
climate observations reference network (ACorn-sAT) calculated for the entire period 1910 to 2013. Source: BoM 2014a.
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2.2 Warming of the  
 Climate System
To understand how the climate is 
changing, the climate system as 
a whole, not only the atmosphere 
just above the Earth’s surface, must 
be considered. The climate system 
consists of the entire atmosphere, 
the oceans, the land surface, and 
the cryosphere (the frozen parts of 
the Earth). The climate system also 
includes the physical, chemical and 
biological processes that transport 
and store energy, carbon and other 
elements. All of these parts and 
processes need to be monitored to 
understand how the entire climate 
system is changing. 
Despite the focus on air temperature, 
warming of the air accounts for only 1% 
of the additional energy stored in the 
climate system as a result of the increase in 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. More 
than 90% of the total energy accumulated 
between 1971 and 2010 has been absorbed 
by the world’s oceans (Figure 5). More than 
60% of the net energy increase in the climate 
system during that period is stored in the 
upper ocean (0-700 m). The upper 75 m 
has warmed by 0.11°C per decade over the 
period 1992 to 2010. it is likely that the deeper 
ocean has also warmed, though somewhat 
unevenly. observations from 1957 to 2009 
show ocean warming at depths between 700 
and 2000 m below the surface, but there has 
likely been no significant warming of the 
layer 2000 - 3000 m below the surface for 
this period. however, significant warming 
has likely occurred even deeper, below 3000 
m, with the largest increase observed in the 
deep waters of the southern ocean.
The earth is 
warming strongly. 
The air, the 
ocean, and the 
land surface are 
all warming.
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Figure 5: The ocean is warming strongly. Plot of energy accumulation in ZJ (1 ZJ is 1021 J (Joules)) within distinct components 
of earth’s climate system relative to 1971 and from 1971-2010 unless otherwise indicated. ocean warming (heat content 
change) dominates, with the upper ocean (light blue, above 700 m) contributing more than the deep ocean (dark blue, below 
700 m; including below 2000 m estimates starting from 1992). ice melt (light grey, for glaciers and ice caps, Greenland and 
Antarctic ice sheet estimates starting from 1992, and Arctic sea ice estimate from 1979-2008); continental (land) warming 
(orange); and atmospheric warming (purple, estimate starting from 1979) make smaller contributions. Uncertainty in the 
ocean estimate also dominates the total uncertainty (dot-dashed lines about the error from all five components at 90% 
confidence intervals). Source: rhein et al. 2013.
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2.3 Changes in the  
 Water Cycle
The focus here is on changes in 
precipitation averaged over global 
land areas (Figure 6), as this is 
important for availability of water 
for human societies. Averaged 
over the mid-latitudes of Northern 
Hemisphere land areas, precipitation 
has increased since 1901 and 
especially since 1951 (with high 
confidence). For other latitudes in 
both hemispheres, area-averaged, 
long-term trends in precipitation 
are difficult to discern with any 
confidence.
1901 - 2010 1951 - 2010
10050251052.50-2.5-5-10-25-50-100
OBSERVED CHANGE IN ANNUAL PRECIPITATION OVER LAND
(mm yr1 per decade)
Figure 6: Maps of observed precipitation change from 1901 to 2010 and from 1951 to 2010 (trends in annual accumulation) 
from one data set. Source: iPCC 2013.
Global rainfall 
patterns are 
changing with 
rainfall increasing 
in some areas  
and decreasing  
in others.
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southern Australia has 
experienced a drying 
trend over the past few 
decades, characterised 
by a 10-20% reduction in 
cool-season rainfall.
Changes in the water cycle are especially 
important for Australia, as our climate is 
prone to both extensive, prolonged droughts 
and heavy rainfall and associated flooding. 
recent changes in precipitation patterns 
across Australia are shown in Figure 7 
for the 1997-2013 period. rainfall during 
october to April over this period was very 
much above average over large parts of the 
continent (Figure 7a); the period 2010 to 
2012 recorded the highest 24-month rainfall 
totals for Australia as a whole. The trend of 
increased warm-month rainfall has become 
most apparent since the early 1970s, and has 
intensified since the mid-1990s.
in contrast, southern Australia has 
experienced a drying trend (Figure 7b) over 
the past few decades, characterised by a 
10-20% reduction in cool-season (April-
september) rainfall. The reduction is most 
pronounced in southwest Western Australia 
from the late-1960s (ioCi 2011) and in 
southeast Australia from the mid-1990s. 
Climate change is likely a contributing 
factor to the observed rainfall declines via its 
influence in the southward shift of the rain-
bearing fronts from the southern ocean, 
which normally account for much of the 
cool-season rainfall in southern Australia.
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Figure 7a: rainfall deciles for october to April (the northern wet season) 1997 to 2013, relative to the reference period 1900-
2013, based on AWAP data. Source: BoM 2014a, cited in Csiro and BoM 2015.
Figure 7b: rainfall deciles for April to september (southern wet season) 1997-2013, relative to the reference period 1900-2013, 
based on AWAP data. Source: BoM 2014a.
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Figure 8: the Athabascan Glacier in the Canadian rockies.
2.4 Change in the  
 Cryosphere
The cryosphere comprises the 
frozen part of the climate system 
– the polar ice sheets, continental 
glaciers (e.g. Figure 8), sea ice, 
permafrost (frozen soil) and seasonal 
snow cover. As the Earth warms, 
an increasing loss of ice and frozen 
soil has become clear over the past 
several decades.
The average rate of ice loss from glaciers 
around the world was 226 Gt (billion tonnes) 
per year from 1971 to 2009, increasing to 
275 Gt per year in the period 1993-2009. The 
average rate of ice loss from the large polar 
ice sheets has increased sharply over the past 
two decades, with important consequences 
for sea-level rise (section 2.5). ice loss from 
Greenland has risen substantially, from 34 
Gt per year in the 1992-2001 period to 215 
Gt per year in the 2002-2011 period, an 
increase of more than six-fold, while the net 
losses from the Antarctic ice sheet over the 
comparable periods were 30 and 147 billion 
tonnes per year, respectively (Figure 9). The 
extent of northern hemisphere snow cover 
has decreased since the mid-20th century, 
permafrost temperatures have increased 
in most regions since the early 1980s, and 
a considerable reduction in permafrost 
thickness and areal extent has been observed 
over the period 1975-2005 in the russian 
european north.
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Figure 9: substantial ice loss from Greenland and Antarctica. Distribution of ice loss for (a) Antarctica and (b) Greenland 
shown in cm of water per year (cm of water yr-1) for the period 2003 to 2012. Source: stocker et al. 2013.
ice loss from Greenland has increased more 
than six-fold between 1992 and 2001.
The annual average extent of Arctic sea 
ice – ice floating on the surface of the 
Arctic ocean – decreased by 3.5-4.1% per 
decade over the 1979-2012 period, and 
the summer sea ice minimum, which 
represents perennial ice, decreased by 9.4-
13.6% per decade over that period. Based 
on comparisons with palaeo-climate data, 
Arctic sea ice retreat over the past three 
decades was unprecedented in at least the 
last 1,450 years. By contrast, there has been 
a slight increase (1.2 to 1.8% per decade) in 
sea-ice extent around Antarctica over the 
1979-2012 period. There are, however, strong 
regional differences around Antarctica 
in terms of where the ice-free season has 
lengthened and where it has decreased. Data 
are inadequate to make any assessment of 
changes in sea-ice thickness and volume.
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Arctic sea ice retreat over the past 
three decades was unprecedented 
in at least the last 1,450 years.
The changes in sea-ice extent in both the 
Arctic (Figure 10) and Antarctic are consistent 
with a warming planet. in the Arctic 
region, which has been warming at a rate 
considerably greater than the global average, 
loss of sea-ice in summer increases the area 
of darker ocean water, in turn leading to an 
increase in absorption of sunlight that further 
enhances regional warming and loss of sea 
ice, thus forming a reinforcing feedback loop. 
in the Antarctic region, the small increases 
in sea-ice extent are due to changes in ocean 
circulation and the freshening of surface 
waters from continental ice melt and runoff, 
both of which are consistent with warming.
Figure 10: Arctic sea ice melt.
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2.5 Sea-level Rise
Sea level is rising due to increasing 
ocean heat content and consequent 
thermal expansion as well as 
loss of water from land-based ice 
sheets and glaciers to the ocean. 
Over the period from 1901 to 2010, 
global average sea level rose by 
0.19 m (Figure 11). It is likely that 
the average rate of sea-level rise 
between 1901 and 2010 was 1.7 mm 
per year, increasing to 3.2 mm per 
year between 1993 and 2010. 
since the early 1970s, glacier mass loss and 
the thermal expansion of the ocean are the 
most important factors driving the observed 
sea-level rise, with the loss of polar ice from 
Greenland and Antarctica increasing in 
importance since the 1990s.
sea-level rise around Australia was, on 
average, 2.1 mm per year for the 1966-2009 
period and 3.1 mm per year for the 1993-2009 
period, close to the global averages (White et 
al. 2014).
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Figure 11: Global mean sea level relative to the 1900-1905 mean of the longest running data set, and with all data sets aligned 
to have the same value in 1993, the first year of satellite altimetry data. All time series (coloured lines indicating different time 
series) show annual values, and where assessed, uncertainties are indicated by coloured shading. Source: iPCC 2013. 
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Changes in extreme weather events are 
critically important in terms of risks to 
our health, communities, infrastructure, 
economy, livelihoods, and natural 
ecosystems. Climate change is making 
many types of extreme weather events more 
frequent and severe. The influence of climate 
change on the frequency and severity of 
many extreme weather events is shown in 
Table 1, including the level of confidence that 
human influence on extreme weather  
is already discernible.
2.6 Extreme Weather Events
Extreme event Observed change Human contribution
Projected change 
2016-2035
Projected change 
2081-2100
Warm spells/ 
heatwaves
increased frequency 
and intensity over 
most land areas 
(medium confidence)
likely Further increases likely Further increases 
virtually certain
heavy 
precipitation 
events
increase in frequency 
and amount of heavy 
precipitation: likely 
more land areas 
with increases than 
decreases
Medium confidence Further increases likely 
over many land areas
Further increases very 
likely over most of 
the mid-latitude land 
masses and over wet 
tropical regions
Drought increases in intensity 
and/or duration of 
drought likely in 
some regions: low 
confidence on a  
global scale 
low confidence low confidence likely (medium 
confidence) on a 
regional to global scale
Tropical 
cyclones
increase in intense 
tropical cyclone 
activity virtually 
certain in north 
Atlantic since 1970 
but low confidence in 
changes elsewhere
low confidence low confidence increase in intense 
cyclone activity more 
likely than not in 
Western north Pacific 
and north Atlantic
extreme high 
sea-level 
events
increased incidence 
and magnitude of 
extreme high sea-level 
events likely since 1970
likely Further increases likely Further increases  
very likely
Table 1: extreme weather and climate events: global-scale assessment of recent observed changes, human contribution to 
the changes, and projected changes for the future (based on iPCC (2013), Table 1 summary for Policy Makers).
Terms used by the iPCC to describe the 
likelihood (probability) of an outcome:
Virtually certain   99-100% 
Very likely   90-100% 
likely    66-100% 
About as likely as not  33-66% 
Unlikely   0-33% 
Very unlikely   0-10% 
exceptionally unlikely  0-1%
The iPCC also uses “high, medium and low 
confidence” to describe the confidence in the 
validity of a finding.
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Many changes in extreme weather events 
have been observed since about 1950 on a 
global scale. it is likely that the frequency of 
heatwaves has increased in large parts of 
europe, Asia and Australia. There are likely 
more land areas where the number of heavy 
precipitation events has increased than areas 
where it has decreased. The frequency and/
or intensity of heavy precipitation events 
has likely increased in north America and 
europe. it is virtually certain that intense 
tropical cyclone activity has increased in the 
north Atlantic region since 1970. 
Changes in extreme weather events have 
also been recorded in Australia (Table 2). 
heatwaves are becoming hotter, lasting 
longer and occurring more often in many 
regions across the continent (Perkins and 
Alexander 2013). since 2001 the number 
of extreme heat records has outnumbered 
extreme cool records by almost 3 to 1 for 
daytime maximum temperatures and almost 
5 to 1 for night-time minimum temperatures. 
Very warm months have increased five-fold 
in the past 15 years.
high fire danger weather is worsening in 
the southeast of the country. The Forest Fire 
Danger index (FFDi) increased significantly 
at 16 out of 38 measuring stations, with no 
stations showing decreases, over the period 
1973 to 2010; stations showing significant 
increases in FFDi are concentrated in the 
southeast. extreme sea-level events have 
tripled at sydney and Fremantle since the 
middle of the 20th century (Church et al. 2006). 
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Table 2: extreme weather and climate events in Australia: assessment of recent observed changes, human contribution to 
the changes, and projected changes for the future. Sources: Csiro and BoM (2015)1, references therein, and other references 
noted in this report.
1 see: http://www.climatechangeinaustralia.gov.au/en/.
Extreme event Observed change Influence of climate change
Projected change  
for the future
Extreme heat:  
hot days and  
heatwaves
since 2001 extreme heat 
records have outnumbered 
extreme cold records by 3:1. 
Very warm months have 
increased 5-fold in last 15 
years. From 1971-2008, 
duration and frequency of 
heatwaves has increased.  
The hottest days have  
become hotter
increase of mean temperature 
stacks the odds towards more 
extreme heat
Further increases very likely: 
more frequent and hotter hot 
days; longer and more severe 
heatwaves
Bushfire weather Forest Fire Danger index 
(FFDi) was originally on 
a scale 0 to 100. After the 
‘Black saturday’ fires in 
Victoria in 2009, the FFDi 
was revised and the category 
‘Catastrophic’ (FFDi>100)  
was added
increase in extreme heat and 
increasing incidence of high 
fire danger weather 
longer and hotter fire  
seasons in southern and 
eastern Australia
Heavy precipitation 
events
little evidence of changes to 
date, but expected changes in 
the future
Warming climate increases 
evaporation and water vapour 
content in atmosphere
extreme rain events likely  
to become more intense
Drought still dominated by natural 
variability in general; 
however, recent Millennium 
Drought (1996-2010) was 
likely influenced by drying 
trend in southeast since mid-
1990s in the cooler months. 
Pronounced drying trend in 
southwest Western Australia 
since late-1960s in the cooler 
months
likely climate change 
influence in drying trends 
in sW and se Australia via 
southward shift of frontal 
systems from southern  
ocean in cooler months  
and intensification of  
sub-tropical ridge
increase in time in drought 
in southern Australia, with 
greater frequency of severe 
droughts. Possible increase of 
time in drought and severity 
of droughts elsewhere
Tropical cyclones no clear trends in cyclone 
frequency or intensity  
(wind speeds) in the 
Australian region
no clear evidence of climate 
change influence yet
increase in intense cyclone 
activity more likely than not 
in Australian region later this 
century; possible southward 
extension of storm tracks
Extreme high sea-
level events
incidence of extreme high 
sea-level events increased  
by factor of 3 at sydney  
and Fremantle since  
mid-20th century
higher sea levels raise the 
level of storm surge/high 
tide events relative to fixed 
infrastructure and property
Further increases likely
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2.7 Projections for  
 the Future
Continued emissions of greenhouse 
gases will cause further warming 
and changes in all components 
of the climate system. Over the 
next decade or two, changes in the 
climate system are similar for all 
emissions scenarios but become 
distinctly different towards the end 
of this century. That is, in the longer 
term, the severity and rate of climate 
change will be strongly influenced 
by the level of greenhouse gases 
emitted from human activities from 
now onwards. More rapid and deep 
emissions reductions will limit the 
speed and magnitude of future 
changes to the climate system.
The rise in global average surface temperature 
for the period 2016-2035 relative to 1986-
2005 will likely be in the range 0.3 to 0.7°C. 
increases by 2081-2100 depend significantly 
on the amount of emissions (Figure 12). A 
very strong and rapid decarbonisation of the 
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Figure 12: CMiP5 (Coupled Model intercomparison Project) multi-model simulated time series from 1950 to 2100 for change 
in global annual mean surface temperature relative to 1986-2005. Time series of projections and a measure of uncertainty 
(shading) are shown for scenarios rCP2.6 (blue) and rCP8.5 (red). Black (grey shading) is the modelled historical evolution 
using historical reconstructed forcings. The mean and associated uncertainties averaged over 2081-2100 are given for all 
rCP scenarios as coloured vertical bars. The numbers of CMiP5 models used to calculate the multi-model mean is indicated. 
Source: iPCC 2013.
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global economy, including net sequestration 
of carbon by 2100, could stabilise the climate 
system at a level between 0.3 and 1.7°C 
above the 1986-2005 average (0.9°C to 2.3°C 
above pre-industrial with a non-negligible 
chance of warming greater than 2°C above 
pre-industrial), while a business-as-usual 
(current trajectory) emission scenario could 
lead to additional temperature rises of 4°C or 
above by the end of the century and further 
rises beyond.
Most of the additional energy in the 
climate system will be stored in the world’s 
oceans, which will continue to warm until 
an equilibrium is reached centuries after 
greenhouse gas emissions are reduced 
and then eliminated. heat will continue to 
penetrate from the surface to the deeper 
levels and the ocean circulation will be 
modified by changes to the ocean’s heat 
budget and salinity. land areas will warm 
substantially more than the oceans, and 
somewhat more than the global average. 
There is very high confidence in continued 
increases of average, daily minimum and 
daily maximum temperatures throughout 
this century for all regions of Australia 
(Figure 13). By 2030 Australian annual 
average temperature is projected to increase 
by 0.6 to 1.3°C above the 1986-2005 average 
(1.2 to 1.9°C above pre-industrial). By the end 
of the century, annual average temperature 
is projected to increase by 0.6 to 1.7°C (1.2°C 
to 2.3°C above pre-industrial) for a scenario 
with rapid and deep emission reductions, 
but by 2.8 to 5.1°C (3.4 to 5.7°C above pre-
industrial) for a business-as-usual emissions 
scenario. Projected warming is expected 
to be greater than the average in inland 
Australia and less than the average in coastal 
areas. There is very high confidence that 
sea surface temperatures around Australia 
will continue to rise. overall, temperature 
change across Australia and surrounding 
oceans is projected to be slightly more than 
the global average.
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Figure 13: Time series for Australian average temperature for 1910-2090 as simulated in CMiP5 (Coupled Model 
intercomparison Project), relative to the 1950-2005 mean. The central line is the median value, and the shading is the 10th and 
90th percentile range of 20-year running means (inner) and single year values (outer). The grey shading indicates the period 
of historical simulation while three future emission scenarios are shown with colour-coded shading: rCP8.5 (purple), rCP4.5 
(blue) and rCP2.6 (green). ACorn-sAT observations are shown in brown and simulations of future climate projections from 
Australia’s national climate model (ACCess) are shown in light purple. Source: Csiro and BoM 2015.
Figure 14: Projections of global mean sea-level rise over the 21st century relative to 1986-2005 from the combination of the 
CMiP5 ensemble with process-based models, for rCP2.6 and rCP8.5. The assessed likely range is shown as a shaded band. 
The assessed likely ranges for the mean over the period 2081-2100 for all rCP scenarios are given as coloured vertical bars, 
with the corresponding median values given as a horizontal line. Source: iPCC 2013.
Changes in the global water cycle over the 
21st century will not be uniform across the 
globe. The contrast in precipitation between 
wet and dry regions and between wet and 
dry seasons will increase, although there 
may be regional exceptions. Another way 
of saying this is that dry areas will tend to 
become drier, and wet areas wetter.
in Australia there is high agreement amongst 
models that cool-season rainfall is likely 
to decline across the southern part of the 
continent, with winter decreases of as much 
as 50% for southwest Western Australia. The 
direction and magnitude of rainfall change 
in other seasons in southern Australia, and 
across the rest of the continent in all seasons, 
are uncertain. in particular, the outlook for 
northern Australia is very uncertain, in part 
because of the uncertainty in the response 
of enso (el niño-southern oscillation) to 
climate change.
it is very likely that Arctic sea ice cover 
will continue to shrink and thin and that 
northern hemisphere spring snow cover will 
decrease during the 21st century. The amount 
of ice in the world’s glaciers will decline 
further, contributing to the rise in sea level.
Global average sea level will continue to rise 
during the 21st century (Figure 14). Under 
all emission scenarios, the rate of sea-level 
rise will very likely exceed the rate observed 
during the 1971-2010 period due to increased 
ocean warming and increased mass loss 
from glaciers and ice sheets. The ranges 
given in Figure 14 are likely ranges, and 
by the end of the 21st century even larger 
rises are possible if marine-based sectors 
of the Antarctic ice sheet collapse. sea-level 
rise will continue for centuries after 2100, 
and some potentially major contributions 
to sea-level rise, such as the loss of much 
of the Greenland ice sheet, are essentially 
irreversible on human timeframes.
R
C
P
8
.5
R
C
P
6
.0
R
C
P
4
.5
R
C
P
2
.6
(m
)
Year
0.0
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
Mean over
2081 - 2100
GLOBAL MEAN SEA LEVEL RISE
2000 20402020 2060 2080 2100
24chapter 02 
The Science of climaTe change
The projections for sea-level rise for 
Australia are similar to the global projections. 
Australian sea levels are projected to continue 
to rise through the 21st century at a rate faster 
than that over the past four decades or over 
the 20th century as a whole, under any likely 
greenhouse gas emission scenario.
Globally, it is very likely that heatwaves 
will occur more frequently and last longer. 
extreme precipitation events over most of 
the mid-latitude land masses and over wet 
tropical regions will likely become more 
intense and more frequent by the end of  
the century.
Projections for Australia indicate, with 
considerable confidence, that many extreme 
weather events will become worse through 
this century. More frequent and hotter hot 
days are expected as the century proceeds 
(very high confidence). extreme rain events 
are projected to become more intense (high 
confidence). Time in drought is projected 
to increase in southern Australia (high 
confidence), with a greater frequency of 
severe droughts (medium confidence). 
southern and eastern Australia are projected 
to experience harsher fire weather (high 
confidence). Tropical cyclones may occur 
less often but become more intense (medium 
confidence), and could reach further south 
(low confidence). extreme sea-level events 
are very likely to increase (high confidence).
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The changes in the climate system 
described in the previous section 
pose serious risks across every 
sector of our society, with significant 
and costly impacts already being 
observed in virtually all regions of 
the country. These risks will continue 
to increase over the coming decades 
and beyond, with the level and 
severity of the risks in the second 
half of the century dependent on how 
successful we are in decarbonising 
the global economy in the next 20-
30 years. Without effective climate 
policy and action, the projected 
impacts from the worst-case scenario 
towards the end of the 21st century is 
staggering, threatening the viability 
of our way of life. 
In the sections below we outline 
the impacts that climate change is 
already having, and the risks that 
it poses in the future, for health, 
security, the economy, urban areas, 
regional Australia and natural 
ecosystems. We then present an 
analysis of the impacts and risks 
of climate change for Australia 
in a global context; this analysis 
underscores the compelling case for 
stabilising the climate system at a 
temperature rise of no more than 2°C 
above pre-industrial. 
3. The risks 
oF CliMATe 
ChAnGe For 
AUsTrAliA
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the impacts of climate change are 
already being felt, and the risks will 
rise as the severity of climate change 
increases, with associated costs.
We face significant risks to health, 
well-being and survival from climate 
change (Table 3). Although our 
health care system can protect us 
to some extent from these risks, 
3.1. Climate Change  
 and Health 
Table 3: summary of health risks of climate change for Australians.
Event Examples of health effects People most affected (see section 4)
Higher temperatures  › higher incidence of allergies caused by pollen.
 › higher incidence of mosquito-borne diseases.
 › higher incidence of food and water borne diseases.
- Those with existing illnesses
- Those in hotter climates
- Children
Heatwaves  › higher incidence of heat-related illnesses, such as exhaustion, heatstroke 
and acute renal failure.
 › exacerbation of existing health conditions, such as predisposition to heart 
attack and kidney disease.
 › higher incidence of mental and behavioural disorders.
 › More premature deaths.
- Those with existing illnesses
- City dwellers
- low-income households
- outdoor workers
- older Australians
- indigineous communities
- Tourists
- obese and overweight people
- Children
Bushfires  › More injuries burns and accidental death.
 › higher incidence of respiratory illness, such as asthma attacks.
 › higher incidence of mental health problems, including trauma and 
longer-term disruptions to social systems.
- rural, urban-fringe and other  
   fire-prone communities
- indigenous communities
- Children
- older Australians
Long-term drought /
decreased rainfall
 › higher incidence of mental health problems, including suicidal behaviour, 
from loss of income and moral and disruptions to social systems.
 › reduced access to fresh healthy food from reduced food yield.
 › higher incidence of illness from contamination of water supplies and 
reducd hygiene due to water shortage.
- rural communities
- indigenous communities
- low-income households
- Children
Flood / increased 
rainfall
 › More injuries, drowning and other accidnetal deaths.
 › higher incidence of infectious disease, such as from contamination of 
food and water supplies.
 › increased risk of respiratory illness from mould.
- rural communities
- Children
Extreme weather 
events
 › More injuries and death.
 › higher incidence of mental health problems.
 › exacerbation of existing illnesses from reduced access to health care.
 › reduced access to fresh, healthy food and clean water.
- emergency workers
- Children
- rural communities
- older Australians
- Tourists
- low-income households
- Coastal communities
Source: Climate Commission 2011.
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increased incidence of extreme heat 
associated with the rise in average 
temperature has a clear impact on human 
health. extreme heat has caused more 
deaths than any other natural hazard across 
Australia over the past 100 years (Coates 
1996). over the past four decades there has 
been a steady increase in the number of 
deaths in summer, compared to those in 
winter, in Australia, indicating that warming 
is already affecting mortality rates (PwC 
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Figure 15: Mortality and temperature during the 2009 Melbourne heatwave. This graph shows the relationship between 
prolonged periods of higher temperature and death rates over the same period. Source: adapted from Dhs 2009.
2011; Bennett et al. 2013). For example, 
a severe heatwave in Melbourne in late 
January-early February 2009, during which 
maximum temperatures rose to the mid-40s 
for three consecutive days and night-time 
temperatures remained unusually high, led 
to an estimated 374 more deaths than would 
normally be expected at that time of year 
(Dhs 2009; Figure 15).
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other capital cities have also suffered the 
impacts of extreme heat. Deaths in Brisbane 
increased by 23% during the 7-26 February 
2004 heatwave (Tong et al. 2010). During the 
heatwave of January 1994, sydney recorded 
110 excess heat-related deaths (Gosling et al. 
2007). human heat exposures can escalate 
as urban infrastructure is also affected by 
the hot conditions, with power blackouts 
and extended waiting times arising from 
surges in ambulance call-outs (QUT 2010). 
Without adaptation, heatwaves may cause 
more than 6000 additional deaths (or more 
than 400 deaths annually) by 2050 in Victoria 
alone (keating and handmer 2013). overall, 
deaths from heatwaves in Australian cities 
are projected to double over the next 40 years 
(PWC 2011). 
The number of hot days when outdoor 
labour becomes dangerous is also projected 
to increase substantially by 2070, with 
considerable associated costs due to lost 
productivity and increased hospitalisations 
(hanna et al. 2011; Maloney and Forbes 2011; 
AAs 2015). only 41% of fully acclimatised 
Australian workers can operate at or near full 
capacity on days over 35°C, and nearly a third 
perform at less than 70% capacity (hanna and 
Davis 2015). Further warming will amplify 
Australia’s existing summertime productivity 
decline. Acclimatisation can offer some heat 
protection, but there are physiological limits 
to human capacity to thermoregulate (hanna 
and Tait 2015). increasingly hot summers will 
therefore risk more lives among those unable 
to secure cooled environments.
Beyond the direct effects on health, extreme 
heat also has important indirect effects, for 
example, by increasing the risk of severe 
bushfires. The Black saturday bushfires in 
Victoria in 2009, which occurred during 
the Melbourne heatwave described above, 
resulted in 173 deaths and 414 injuries, 
ranking it as one of the world’s ten most 
deadly bushfires in history (Teague et al. 
2010; PoV 2010). smoke from bushfires 
can also have significant health impacts. 
Cardiac arrests outside of hospitals have 
been reported to increase by 50% on 
bushfire smoke-affected days in Melbourne 
(Dennekamp et al. 2011). Asthma admissions 
in sydney hospitals have been reported to rise 
by 12% on days of “smoke events” compared 
to non-smoke days (Martin et al. 2013). The 
trauma and stress of experiencing a bushfire 
can increase depression, anxiety and other 
mental health issues, both in the immediate 
aftermath of the fire and for months or years 
afterwards (McFarlane and raphael 1984; sim 
2002; Whittaker et al. 2012). 
Deaths from heatwaves 
in Australian cities are 
projected to double over 
the next 40 years.
increasing extreme heat is 
already affecting mortality rates.
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other indirect impacts of extreme heat on 
health include: (i) power outages, which 
can lead to loss of air-conditioning and 
refrigeration, which in turn can lead to 
increase in harmful bacteria in food and to 
food poisoning; (ii) breakdowns in public 
transport, making it difficult for people to 
get to hospitals or cooler places; and (iii) 
increases in mental health problems in 
heat-stressed workers, such as aggression, 
confusion, psychological distress and 
behavioural change (Climate Council 2014b).
serious health impacts can result from 
severe floods, a well-known consequence  
of extreme rainfall events that are occurring 
more often as a result of climate change.  
The massive floods in Queensland in 
2010/2011, during which 78% of the state was 
declared a disaster zone, led to 33 deaths, 
widespread contamination of drinking 
water and food, and difficulties in accessing 
health services and treatments (QFCi 
2012). substantial increases in bacterial 
gastroenteritis are projected in the future; 
205,000 to 335,000 new cases by 2050, and 
239,000 to 870,000 cases by 2100, depending 
on the emission scenario (Bambrick et al. 
2008; harley et al. 2011). 
The prospect of longer, hotter and drier 
droughts in the future has significant 
implications for mental health, especially 
in rural areas. Droughts are associated 
with increased incidence of suicide in 
rural populations, especially amongst male 
farmers (Page et al. 2002; nicholls et al. 
2006; hanigan et al. 2012). Mental health 
impacts of drought are not confined to adults. 
experience of drought is also associated with 
behavioural problems, stress, hyperactivity 
and difficulty in maintaining relationships in 
adolescents (Dean and stain 2010). 
Drought can also cause serious health 
impacts by reducing the availability and 
quality of water. For example, drought lowers 
water quantities in dams, thus increasing 
the concentration of pollutants and hotter 
temperatures can increase the growth of blue-
green algae (kjellstrom and Weaver 2009).
one of the most important indirect effects of 
climate change is its influence on the vectors 
that spread infectious diseases. Climate 
change affects the geographic distribution 
of mosquito-borne diseases such as malaria, 
dengue fever and tick-borne diseases (AAs 
2015). Globally, the distributions of several 
diseases have changed in recent decades in 
association with changes in regional climate 
(iPCC 2014). in Australia, mosquito-borne 
diseases such as dengue fever are projected 
to extend their range and activity. A highly 
efficient disease vector that is capable of 
transmitting at least 22 different viruses, the 
Asian tiger mosquito (Aedes albopictus), is 
already widespread throughout the Torres 
Climate change increases the risk of severe 
bushfires, and consequent death and injury.
The number of Australians exposed to 
dengue fever could increase more than 
tenfold by 2100.
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strait islands and has been repeatedly 
detected at ports (Duncombe et al. 2013). 
Dengue is currently confined to northern 
Queensland, where outbreaks occur almost 
annually (ritchie 2009; russell et al. 2009). 
however, without effective action on 
climate change, the area suitable for dengue 
transmission will likely spread southwards, 
increasing the current number of Australians 
at risk of exposure from 430,000 today to 
between five and eight million by the end of 
the century (Bambrick et al. 2008; Åström 
et al. 2012), although changes in domestic 
water storage that can occur in response to 
urban water scarcity may have an even more 
important influence on disease incidence 
(Beebe et al. 2009; kearney et al. 2009). 
Climate change action is crucial to protect 
Australians health in the long-term.
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Figure 16: Possible timeline of some future adverse health impacts in Australia from climate change. Source: Climate 
Commission 2011; adopted from McMichael 2011 (unpublished).
in summary, the impacts of climate change 
on health are already being felt, and are 
likely to get worse as time goes on (Figure 
16). Without effective action on climate 
change, the risk of serious health impacts will 
increase sharply during the second half of 
the century. 
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Human security is a condition 
that exists when human lives are 
protected, and when people have 
the freedom and capacity to live 
with dignity (Adger et al 2014). 
Climate change poses a threat to 
human security in a variety of 
ways including by undermining: 
health (Section 3.1), the economic 
conditions necessary for prosperity 
and poverty alleviation (Section 3.3), 
food and water systems, and critical 
infrastructure. 
3.2. Climate Change  
 and Security 
These impacts in turn amplify the risk 
of displacement, migration, and political 
tensions within and between countries 
(Adger et al. 2014). Climate change and its 
impacts will also have implications for the 
security sector, for example Defence forces 
are increasingly being called upon to assist 
with relief efforts following climate-related 
natural disasters (e.g. Us Department of 
Defence 2014; Figure 17).
Figure 17: The Us Army Assists with Pakistani Flood recovery.
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in the Asia-Pacific region, 
increasing extreme weather puts 
people and communities at risk.
cyclones are all known factors in 
displacement and migration (e.g. Ballu et al. 
2011; Dun 2011; Gila et al. 2011; Mcleman 
2013). Major extreme weather events have 
led to significant population displacement 
in the past, and projected future increases 
in the incidence of extreme events, such 
as extreme coastal flooding, are likely to 
amplify the risks of population displacement 
(Adger et al. 2014). A world that has warmed 
4°C above pre-industrial levels (by 2100 or 
later), producing a 0.5–2 m sea-level rise, will 
expose between 1.2 and 2.2 million people 
from the Caribbean, indian ocean and Pacific 
ocean to inundation (nicholls et al. 2011). 
While the science of estimating the extent 
of future migration influenced by climate 
change cannot yet provide robust numbers 
(Barnett and o’neill 2012), there is widespread 
agreement in the literature that increased 
displacement and migration as a result of 
future environmental changes and extreme 
climate events is likely (Adger et al. 2014). 
For example, it is understood that some of 
the drivers of migration and displacement 
within and between states can be exacerbated 
by changes in climate and environmental 
conditions. Drought and land degradation, 
flooding, sea-level rise (Figure 18) and 
Figure 18: Coastal flooding on saibai, Torres strait islands.
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in the Asia-Pacific region future changes 
in climate coupled with demographic and 
economic trends suggest that increased 
displacement and migration is likely. The 
region is one of the world’s most disaster 
prone; in 2014 over half of the world’s 226 
natural disasters occurred here (Un 2014), 
and many of these were associated with 
episodes of population displacement. over 
half of the urban population in Asia lives in 
low-lying coastal zones and flood plains that 
are highly exposed to the effects of climate 
change. Asia is also home to more than 
90% of the global population that is exposed 
to tropical cyclones, with rising sea-levels 
magnifying the impact of storms (hijioka et 
al. 2014). For example, in Bangladesh, rising 
sea-level increases saline intrusion, but also 
increases flooding associated with storms 
and cyclones. Cyclone Aila destroyed homes 
(Figure 19), infrastructure, land and livestock 
in 2009, forcing many Bangladeshi rural 
workers to migrate into urban areas following 
the destruction of their farms (kartiki 2011).
The Pacific islands are also highly vulnerable 
to extreme weather events because many are 
low lying, remote and have limited disaster 
mitigation and adaptation capacity (Gero et 
al. 2013), although increasing extreme events 
in the region are much more likely to lead to 
internal (within country) crises rather than 
international migration. in the long term, 
the capacity of low-lying islands to sustain 
significant populations of people is at risk 
(nurse et al. 2014). 
Figure 19: Cyclone Aila damage in Bangladesh.
People displaced by violent conflict 
and/or extreme events are often highly 
vulnerable to further harm from 
climate change.
Displacement such as that driven by extreme 
weather events often undermines human 
security - migrants often have disrupted 
social networks, difficulty accessing work, 
social services, and natural resources, and 
tend to experience increased health problems 
(Barnett and o’neill 2012; Adger et al. 2014). 
Thus people displaced by violent conflict 
and/or extreme events are often highly 
vulnerable to further harm from climate 
change (Barnett and Adger 2007) and under 
some circumstances migrants can increase 
the risk of violent conflict in places where 
they have sought refuge (reuveny 2008).
Figure 20: A family crosses the flooded streets of Pakistan, 2010.
Although there are many complex and 
interacting drivers of conflict that are 
not related to climate, there is “justifiable 
common concern” that climate change can 
increase the risk of armed conflict in certain 
circumstances (Adger et al. 2014), often 
acting as a “threat multiplier” that has the 
potential to make unstable conditions worse 
(e.g. MoD 2010; The White house 2015). 
Climate change can increase the risk of 
armed conflict by exacerbating known risk 
factors such as poverty, economic shocks, 
and unstable state institutions (Adger et al. 
2014). importantly, poorly designed climate 
change mitigation and adaptation polices 
can also increase the risk of armed conflict 
through similar pathways. Furthermore, in 
recent years, extreme weather events such 
as heatwaves, droughts, floods and bushfires 
in major food producing countries have 
contributed to rising food prices (Garnaut 
2011), affecting social and political stability 
(Barrett 2013). The 2008–2009 and 2010–
2011 food price spikes may have also  
affected socio-political stability and 
contributed to food riots in the Middle east, 
and numerous African and latin American 
countries. research on climate change 
and armed conflict shows that a multitude 
of social factors, such as property rights 
institutions, mechanisms for conflict 
resolution, social protection, the availability 
of weapons, and the strength of civil society, 
all mediate between changing climatic 
conditions and violent outcomes, which in 
turn shows that both climate mitigation and 
adaptation are necessary to manage this risk 
(Adger et al. 2014).
Projected sea-level rise, coastline retreat 
and the eventual submergence of small 
low-lying islands may affect the maritime 
boundaries of nations and alter exclusive 
economic zones in which natural resources 
are located. This may intensify existing 
regional tensions and contribute to new 
disputes over access to natural resources 
(houghton et al. 2010). similarly, changing 
patterns of runoff in transboundary rivers 
may increase tensions between states (Adger 
et al. 2014). The availability of new resources 
may also have the potential to increase 
rivalry between nations. For example, 
since 1980, the Arctic has been warming 
at twice the global average, contributing to 
rapid sea ice decline. Melting sea ice makes 
Arctic waters easier to navigate, opening 
up new shipping routes, lengthening the 
shipping season and increasing access 
to significant oil and gas reserves (Adger 
et al. 2014). This could increase the risk of 
Figure 21: The Australian Defence Force health facility provided primary health care to over 11,000 flood-affected people in 
Pakistan in 2010.
Climate change is a ‘threat multiplier’.
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potential disputes between nations over 
access to and exploitation of these reserves 
in the future (CnA 2014), although at present 
existing political institutions have succeeded 
in mediating these tensions (ebinger and 
Zambetakis 2009).
in terms of climate-related natural 
disasters, Australian emergency services 
and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) 
are increasingly engaging in domestic 
and regional disaster assistance and 
humanitarian relief efforts. For example, 
operation Pacific Assist was established 
in response to Tropical Cyclone Pam that 
devastated Vanuatu and the surrounding 
region in March 2015. More than 500 
defence personnel were deployed to assist 
in the recovery (Australian Government 
2015). in the wake of Typhoon haiyan in 
the Philippines in 2013, the ADF evacuated 
over 3,500 internally displaced persons and 
moved thousands of tonnes of aid (Australia 
Government 2013). As the impact of extreme 
weather intensifies in the region, there will 
be increasing need for the ADF to coordinate 
with emergency services and provide more 
humanitarian assistance, both domestically 
and in Australia’s neighbourhood. As 
the incidence of extreme weather events 
increases, the ADF may increasingly need to 
respond to multiple extreme weather events 
both in Australia and in the Asia-Pacific 
region simultaneously (Press et al. 2013; 
Figure 21 and 22).
Figure 22: Members of the Australian Defence Force in Malaysia, 2010.
As extreme weather intensifies the 
Australian Defence Force will need 
to provide more humanitarian 
assistance at home and abroad.
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The impacts of climate change 
on the Australian economy have 
recently come into much sharper 
focus as the economic consequences 
of sea-level rise and coastal flooding, 
heat stress, prolonged drought and 
extreme weather events become 
better understood.
3.3. Climate Change 
 and the Economy
The economic impacts of 
climate change are profound.
Most of our population lives in large cities 
on the coast, and much of our most critical 
infrastructure has been built on low-lying 
areas. More than $226 billion in commercial, 
industrial, road, rail and residential assets 
around the coast, mostly in urban areas, are 
potentially exposed to flooding and erosion 
hazards at a sea-level rise of 1.1 m (DCCee 
2011; Figure 23). exposure is likely to increase 
as Australia’s population grows to a projected 
35 million people by mid-century.
exposure to coastal flooding can be 
translated into projected economic damages 
as the sea level continues to rise. For example, 
in southeast Queensland, a current 1-in-100 
year coastal flooding event risks damage to 
residential buildings of around $1.1 billion. 
With a 0.2 m rise in sea level, a similar 
flooding event would increase damages to 
around $2 billion, and a 0.5 m rise in sea level 
would raise projected damages to $3.9 billion 
(Wang et al. 2010).
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Figure 23: Counting the costs of coastal flooding in Australia. Source: Climate Council 2014a.
More than $226 billion of buildings 
and infrastructure are vulnerable 
to 1.1 m of sea-level rise.
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IN AUSTRALIA,
A 1.1 M SEA
LEVEL RISE 
EXPOSES MORE THAN
 $226 BIL
WORTH OF INFRA-
STRUCTURE TO 
COASTAL 
FLOODING+ 
EROSION.
IGNORING
CLIMATE
CHANGE
COULD COST 
THE WORLD 
US$1 TRIL   
 PER YEAR,
THROUGH COASTAL 
FLOODING ALONE. 
THAT’S ABOUT THE 
SIZE OF AUSTRALIA’S
ENTIRE 
ECONOMY.
HURRICANE 
KATRINA
IN THE USA
CAUSED ABOUT
$US100 BIL
IN DAMAGES AND 
2,000 
FATALITIES.
COASTAL FLOODING: THE SLEEPING
GIANT OF CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS
Figure 24: Coastal flooding: the sleeping giant of climate change risks. Source: Climate Council 2014a.
The increasing incidence of coastal flooding 
as a result of rising sea level has been 
recognised as a sleeping giant in terms of 
its potential to wreak havoc on the global 
economy (Figure 24). By 2050 – without 
adaptation – the losses from coastal flooding 
globally are projected to rise to $Us 1 trillion, 
about the current size of the entire Australian 
economy (hallegatte et al. 2013). By 2100 the 
losses from coastal flooding are projected to 
be 0.3-9.3% of global GDP per year (hinkel 
et al. 2014). The high-end projection is a 
scenario for global economic collapse.
Climate change is expected to multiply 
the costs of coastal flooding.
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Tropical cyclones and other storm systems, 
with their combination of high winds 
and heavy rainfall, can cause significant 
economic damages in addition to their direct 
impacts on health and well-being. examples 
of the damages from specific extreme events 
over the past 15 years include:
 › 2010-2011 Queensland floods and Cyclone 
Yasi: $6 billion (Queensland Government 
2011; QFCi 2012; Figure 25)
 › 2007 Pasha Bulker storm: $458 million 
(McDonald and redford 2008; Verdon-
kidd 2010)
 › 2006 Cyclone larry: ca. $500 million  
(BoM 2014b)
 › 2005 Cyclone ingrid: $17 million 
(Queensland Government 2005; northern 
Territory Government 2005; ABC 2005)
 › 1999 Cyclone Vance: $108 million (2011 
dollars) (AeM 2014).
Figure 25: A Queensland road damaged by the impacts of Cyclone Yasi.
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one of the least known, but potentially most 
damaging, consequences of climate change 
for the economy is the impact of extreme heat 
on worker productivity through absenteeism 
and reductions in work performance. For 
example, the extreme heat of 2013/2014 in 
Australia drove an annual economic burden 
of nearly $8 billion in terms of productivity 
losses (Zander et al. 2015). heat stress in 
northern Australia has already reduced 
labour capacity there by 10% over the past 
few decades, with a further 10% reduction 
projected during the hottest months by 
2050 (Dunne et al. 2013). The loss of worker 
productivity globally due to heat stress is 
projected to be as much as Us$1 trillion by 
2030 (kjellstrom and McMichael 2013).
in addition to their devastating impacts 
on health, bushfires can also result in very 
large economic losses (Table 4). During the 
period 1 July 1966 to 30 June 2013, insured 
losses due to bushfires totalled $5.6 billion 
(in 2011/12 dollars), or an annual loss of $120 
million. in the decade up to 30 June 2013, 
the insured losses from bushfires were $1.6 
billion, an average of $160 million per year 
(iCA 2013). These estimates do not take 
into account indirect costs, such as loss of 
life, social disruption, opportunity costs for 
volunteer fire fighters, impacts on health, 
costs of rebuilding and compensation (king 
et al. 2013b).
Bushfires have been estimated to cost the 
Victorian agricultural industry about $42 
million per year in direct damages and about 
$92 million per year when disruption to 
business is included (keating and handmer 
2013). The costs of the Black saturday fires in 
2009 have been estimated to be about $4.4 
billion (PoV 2010).
extreme heat in 
2013/2014 drove an 
annual economic 
burden of nearly  
$8 billion in terms of 
productivity losses.
From 1966 to 2013 insured losses 
due to bushfires totalled $5.6 billion 
(in 2011/12 dollars), or an annual 
loss of $120 million.
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Table 4: recorded losses from major bushfire events in Australia since 1939. 
Fire Event
Losses 
(direct deaths due to fire)1
Losses 
(including residential 
property, stock)
Significant Insured Losses 
(normalised to 2011 values)2
Black Friday, 
January 1939,  
Victoria
71 
(AiC 2004; reuters 2009)
1000+ homes 
(ABs 2004; AiC 2004)
n/A
Hobart, 
February 1967, 
Tasmania
62 
(reuters 2009; TBi 2013)
1300-1400 homes 
(McAneney et al., 2009;  
TBi 2013)
62,000 stock 
(TBi 2013)
$610 million 
(iCA 2013)
Ash Wednesday, 
February 1983,  
Victoria and south 
Australia
75 
(AiC 2004; reuters 2009; 
stephenson et al., 2013)
> 2,300 homes 
(ramsey et al., 1996; AiC 
2004; McAneney et al., 2009; 
stephenson et al., 2013)
> 200,000 stock 
(ramsey et al., 1996; AiC 2004; 
CFA 2012; stephenson et al., 
2013)
$1.796 billion 
(iCA 2013)
Sydney, NSW, 
January 1994
4 
(reuters et al., 1996; ABs 
2001; nsW Ministry for 
Police & emergency 
services 2007)
> 200 homes 
(ramsey et al., 1996; nsW 
Ministry for Police & 
emergency services 2007)
$215 million 
(iCA 2013)
Canberra &  
alpine fires, 
2003
4 in Canberra 
(Mcleod 2003);
4 in alpine 
(stephenson et al., 2013)
Major injuries: 52; 
Minor injuries: 338 
(stephenson et al., 2013)
> 500 homes 
(Mcleod 2003; McAneney 
et al., 2009) including the Mt 
stromblo observatory (Pitman 
et al., 2007)
> 17,000 stock 
(stephenson et al., 2013)
$660 million 
(iCA 2013)
Black Saturday, 
February 2009,  
Victoria
173 
(Teague et al., 2010, 
stephenson et al., 2013)
Major injuries: 130; 
Minor injuries: 670 
(stephenson et al., 2013)
> 2000 homes 
(CFA 2012; stephenson et al., 
2013)
8000-11,800 stock 
(Teague et al., 2010; 
stephenson et al., 2013)
$1.266 billion 
(iCA 2013)
Tasmania, 
January 2013
0 203 homes 
(TBi 2013)
10,000 stock 
(TBi 2013)
$89 million 
in 2013 values (iCA 2013)
Blue Mountains, 
october 2013
0 208 properties 
(Whyte 2013)
$183 million 
as of 19.11.13 in 2013 values 
(iCA 2013)
1 only deaths attributed directly to fires are included, but it should be noted that other deaths associated indirectly with fires 
have occurred (e.g. deaths indirectly associated with nsW Blue Mountains fires in 2013 include one due to heart attack, and 
another due to a plane crash). 
2 insured losses shown have been normalised to 2011 values (taking inflation, and wealth changes into account) except for 
2013 fires (Tasmania and nsW).
Source: Climate Council 2013.
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The economic impacts of drought are also 
extremely significant at the national level. 
Between 2002 and 2003, for example, 
decreases in agricultural production due to 
drought (e.g. Figure 26) resulted in a 1% fall 
in Australia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
which is equivalent to half of Australia’s 
decline in annual GDP following the global 
financial crisis in 2009 (World Bank 2015). 
This decrease in production represented 
a 28% fall in the gross value added for the 
agricultural industry compared to the 
preceding year (ABs 2004). Between 2006 
and 2009 the Millennium Drought (Figure 
24) reduced national GDP by about 0.75% 
(iPCC 2014); aggregated over the 2002-2009 
period the drop in GDP was 2.4 to 2.9% (van 
Dijk et al. 2013). The 1982-83 drought resulted 
in a loss of about $3 billion in agricultural 
production (ABAres 2012b), about a 1% fall 
in GDP (ABs 2004). From 2020, the predicted 
increase in drought frequency is estimated to 
cost $7.3 billion annually, reducing GDP by 1% 
per annum (Carroll et al. 2007).
Drought assistance also entails large 
economic consequences for Australian 
taxpayers. From 2002-2008 the government 
provided $1 billion in drought assistance to 
farmers (Productivity Commission 2009). 
From 1991 to mid-2010 the government 
had paid a total of $4.4 billion in drought 
assistance (ABAres 2012b).
Figure 26: south Australia in drought in 2008.
44chapter 03 
The Risks of ClimaTe Change foR ausTRalia
Many of Australia’s coastal cities are highly 
vulnerable to coastal flooding during 
storms, especially in terms of economic 
damages (section 3.3). By the end of 
this century, with a business-as-usual 
greenhouse gas emissions scenario, the 
projected increases in coastal flooding 
frequency are startling (see Table 5; Figure 
27). For example, in sydney, Darwin and 
hobart, a current 1-in-100 year flooding 
event would happen every day or so, in 
Melbourne it would happen more than 
every month, and in Adelaide it would 
happen every year or so. The implications 
for coastal infrastructure are enormous.
Australia is one of the most 
urbanised countries in the world, 
with 89% of our population living 
in urban areas in 2014, with this 
proportion projected to grow to 
92% by 2050 (UN 2014). Cities 
are obviously important for the 
reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions, summarised by the 
oft-quoted statement that the 
challenge of climate change will 
be won or lost in the world’s cities. 
The vulnerability of urban dwellers 
to the risks of climate change is 
already apparent, as shown by the 
impacts of heatwaves on health 
(Section 3.1).
3.4. Climate Change 
 and Urban Areas 
Darwin:
every day or so
Hobart: 
every day or so 
Townsville: 
every month or so 
Fremantle: 
every month or so
Sydney: 
every day or so Adelaide: 
every year or so 
Melbourne: 
more than every month
Port Hedland: 
every few months
*Based on a high emissions scenario. 
HOW OFTEN A CURRENT 1-IN-100 YEAR COASTAL FLOODING 
EVENT WOULD HAPPEN IN AUSTRALIAN CITIES IN 2100*
Figure 27: Australian cities are becoming more vulnerable to coastal flooding.
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Urban infrastructure is particularly 
vulnerable to heatwaves.
Table 5: showing expected multiplying factors for coastal flooding for Australian cities in 2100 based on a high emissions 
pathway.
City Multiplying factor Impact
sydney >10000 1-in-100-year event would happen every day or so
Bundaberg >10000 1-in-100-year event would happen every day or so
Townsville 1500 1-in-100-year event would happen every month or so
Darwin >10000 1-in-100-year event would happen every day or so
Port hedland 580 1-in-100-year event would happen every few months
Fremantle 820 1-in-100-year event would happen every month or so
Adelaide 120 1-in-100-year event would happen every year or so
hobart >10000 1-in-100-year event would happen every day or so
Melbourne 2100 1-in-100-year event would happen more than every month
Source: Climate Council 2014a.
Urban infrastructure is vulnerable to other 
types of climate impacts. The 2009 heatwave 
in Victoria caused widespread disruption 
of electricity supplies and transport in 
Melbourne (Figure 28). on the evening of 30 
January, an estimated 500,000 residents were 
without power due to blackouts. railways in 
the Melbourne area were also damaged, with 
29 cases of rail tracks buckling, electrical 
faults that caused breakdowns in signalling, 
and failure of air-conditioning units in 
over 50% of the trains. Table 6 shows how 
heatwaves in Australia’s major cities are 
already changing and how they are projected 
to change into the future.
By 2100 in sydney, Darwin and 
hobart, a current 1-in-100 year 
flooding event would happen 
every day or so.
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INFRASTRUCTURE UNDER STRESS
ELECTRICITY RAILWAYS
1
1
3
3
2 2
4
4On 30 Jan 500,000 residents 
in western and central 
Melbourne experienced a 
blackout lasting from one 
hour up to two days
City loop trains cancelled 
during the evening leaving 
many commuters stranded
Electrical faults 
causing technical 
failures in rail signaling
Train air conditioner 
failure. More than 50% of 
the trains were old style 
and air-conditioning not 
designed to work at 
temperatures over 34.5°C
29 cases of rail tracks buckling
To avoid a city-wide 
blackout, load shedding, or 
‘rolling blackouts’ introduced
Electricity demand in 
Victoria spikes
The heatwave creates 
an increase in 
electricity demand
Figure 28: Anatomy of a heatwave: infrastructure breakdown during the Melbourne 2009 heatwave. Source: Climate 
Council 2014b.
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Table 6: heatwaves in Australia’s capital cities.
City
Number of 
heatwave 
days
Number of 
heatwave 
(events)
Length of 
longest event Changes 
in average 
intensity of 
the heatwave 
(°C)
Changes 
in average 
intensity of 
the peak day 
(°C)
Changes 
in timing 
of first 
event 
(days)
1950-
1980
1981-
2011
1950-
1980
1981-
2011
1950-
1980
1981-
2011
sydney 6 9 1-2 2-3 4 5 1.5 1.5 -19
Melbourne 5 6 1-2 1-2 4 4 1.5 2 -17
Brisbane 10 10 2-3 2-3 6 6 1 1.5 -8
Perth 6 9 1-2 2-3 4 5 1.5 1.5 +3
Adelaide 5 9 1-2 1-2 4 6 2.5 4.3 -2
hobart 4 5 1 1-2 4 4 -1.5 1.7 -12
Darwin 3 7 1 1-2 4 5 0 1 -7
Canberra 6 13 1-2 2-3 5 7 0 1.5 -3
Notes: The average number of heatwave days, number of events, length of the longest event, average heatwave intensity, 
average intensity of the peak heatwave day, and change in the timing of the first summer heatwave for Australia’s capital 
cities (Perkins and Alexander 2013). statistics were calculated from the high-quality ACorn-sAT temperature dataset for 
the period 1951-2011 (Trewin 2012), using the excess heat Factor heatwave definition (nairn and Fawcett 2013; Perkins 
and Alexander 2013). All statistics are rounded to the nearest integer. The first column for each characteristic is for the 
1950–1980 period and the second is for the 1981–2011 period. Changes in average intensity and peak intensity are calculated 
by subtracting the respective average from 1950–1980 and 1981–2011. Changes in timing are calculated by subtracting the 
average start date during 1981–2011 from that of 1950–1980. Source: Climate Council 2014b. 
Floods can also be extremely damaging to 
infrastructure. The 2010/2011 floods in the 
greater Brisbane area caused major damage; 
much of the electrical infrastructure in the 
lockyer Valley was destroyed, and 300,000 
homes in Brisbane and ipswich lost power at 
some stage during the event (QFCi 2012). 
Although droughts are often associated 
with impacts on agriculture and rural 
communities, they also directly threaten 
urban areas through their impact on urban 
water supplies. The rainfall decline in 
southwest Western Australia of 15% since the 
mid-1970s has reduced the annual average 
stream flow into Perth’s dams by nearly 
80% (Figures 29 and 30). reduced rainfall 
creates drier soils and vegetation that, in 
turn, retain more water when rain does 
fall and thus typically reduces stream flow 
disproportionately more than the reduction 
in rainfall. in Melbourne, stage 3 water 
restrictions were implemented from 2007 
to 2010, and by 2009 the city’s water storage 
levels fell to a record minimum of 25.6% 
(Melbourne Water 2013, 2014). 
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Figure 29: Trend in total annual stream flow into Perth dams 1911–2012. Source: Climate Commission 2013.
Figure 30: Changes in water inflow into Perth dams. Source: Climate Commission 2013.
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GIGALITRES
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1911-1974:
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92.7
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65.8
Urban water supplies can also be diminished 
and damaged by bushfires. Following 
the 2003 Canberra fires, there was severe 
disruption to drinking water supplies due to 
increased erosion and runoff from denuded 
soils, increasing sediment and nutrient 
concentrations in the reservoirs (White et 
al. 2006). in the longer term, water supplies 
can be affected by the vigorous regrowth 
of forests, which have been reported to 
use twice as much water as mature forests 
(Buckley et al. 2012). The cost to Melbourne 
of recovering from the damage to the water 
supply system from the Black saturday 
bushfires was estimated to be over $2 billion 
(WrF 2013).
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easy to quantify. other more indirect impacts, 
such as changes to the distribution and 
incidence of pests and diseases, are more 
complex. even more difficult to measure 
are losses due to such factors as reduced 
confidence in investments and adoption of 
new technologies, and changes to the social 
fabric of farming communities (Garnaut 
2008; hayman et al. 2012). 
impacts of climate change, both direct 
and indirect, also interact with changing 
international and national markets, as 
well as technological, social, institutional 
and demographic changes. some experts 
consider that many country towns are 
unlikely to survive until 2050 even in the 
absence of climate change (Beer et al. 2013), 
with some of the most at-risk communities 
being indigenous communities in remote 
areas, especially in the northern Territory. 
This assessment found that the level of 
vulnerability was high throughout nsW, 
but particularly in the remote western 
and northern regions, and in Western 
Australia’s agricultural areas. one of the 
most significant findings of this study was 
that, at both the national and state levels, 
country towns already at risk because 
of demographic change and economic 
restructuring are also the most at risk from 
climate change. 
Climate not only affects virtually every 
aspect of food production and farm 
profitability, it also has significant impacts 
on food affordability, accessibility, quality 
and safety, factors that collectively affect 
food security. The risks posed by climate 
change for Australia’s food production 
systems and our food security are complex 
and inter-connected and include: risks 
posed by ongoing degradation of Australia’s 
natural resource base; direct risks of 
changes in temperature, rainfall and other 
Rural communities already 
face many challenges, such as 
international currency and market 
fluctuations and other global forces; 
population drift to urban areas; 
lack of employment opportunities; 
relatively poor access to education 
and health infrastructure and 
services; competition for water 
and declining water quality; and 
the ongoing degradation of fragile 
landscapes, from soil erosion, 
salinity and pests. 
Climate change is presenting rural and 
regional Australia with an additional set 
of challenges that are interacting with, 
and potentially exacerbating, traditional 
challenges – climate change can be thought 
of as a threat multiplier – exacerbating 
existing stresses on rural communities. 
Current agricultural practices across much 
of the continent are becoming increasingly 
threatened, mainly due to increased risks 
of extreme heat and water scarcity. The 
long-term sustainability, health, livability 
and productivity of Australia’s rural and 
regional country towns will require a strong 
commitment to climate adaptation by 
individuals, families, communities, and all 
levels of government. But moving to a new, 
low carbon economy, also presents exciting 
opportunities.
Vulnerability to the impacts of climate 
change vary a great deal, depending on 
location, environment, remoteness, and 
sources of income. The key changes in 
rural communities include: changing local 
environments and the decline of resources, 
including soil, biodiversity, and major river 
systems; impacts of extreme weather events; 
and changes in agricultural productivity. 
Direct impacts of the changing climate on 
factors such as crop productivity are relatively 
3.5. Regional Australia 
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climatic impacts on agricultural production; 
direct impacts of extreme events on food 
supply, safety and distribution; economic 
risks posed by energy costs and policies, 
including those designed to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions; and changes to 
Australia’s competitiveness due to climatic 
changes in other countries. one study 
by Gunasekera et al. (2007), assuming no 
planned adaptation and a relatively high 
emissions scenario, estimated potential 
declines of Australia’s major export 
commodities (wheat, beef, dairy and sugar) 
of 9-10% by 2030 and 13-19% by 2050, and 
overall declines of agricultural exports by 
11–63% by 2030 and 15–79% by 2050.
The impacts of climate change on the 
Australian agricultural sector are already 
clearly evident and well documented. 
For example, the Millennium Drought 
of 1996-2010 resulted in dramatic drops 
in production; irrigated rice and cotton 
production in the Murray-Darling Basin 
fell by 99% and 84% between 2002 and 
2009, respectively (ABs 2011) and wheat 
production suffered a 12% reduction in yield 
during that period (van Dijk et al. 2013). 
Future declines in freshwater resources have 
been identified as a key risk for Australian 
food production in the Fifth Assessment 
report of the iPCC, should the projections 
of ongoing drying in southern Australia, 
especially in the Murray Darling Basin 
and the wheat belt in southwest Western 
Australia, be realised (reisinger et al. 2014). 
The 2009 heatwave in southeast Australia 
caused crop losses in many vineyards, with 
2008-09 wine production about 7% lower 
than the previous year (Gunning-Trant 
2010). The extremely dry growing conditions 
in 2010 in southwest Western Australia, 
embedded in a long-term drying trend in 
the region, caused a reduction of 43% in 
production of wheat and other winter crops 
compared to the previous season (ABAres 
2011). By 2050, rising temperatures and 
further decreases in rainfall could result in 
yield losses of more than 30% compared to 
1999 (van Gool 2009). 
Tropical cyclones can cause extensive 
damage to livelihoods in rural areas along 
Australia’s northern coasts. For example, 
tropical cyclone larry destroyed many banana 
plantations in Queensland in 2006, causing 
a sharp reduction in banana production at 
the national level for several years. While 
tropical cyclones may not occur more often in 
future, it is projected that their intensity could 
increase, with commensurate increases in 
damage caused (see Tables 1 and 2).
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The livestock industry is also vulnerable 
to the impacts of climate change: extreme 
heat causes loss of appetite, productivity, 
reproductive vigour and sometimes death 
(lefcourt and Adams 1996). Dairy cattle are 
particularly susceptible to heat stress, which 
can reduce appetite, milk production and 
milk quality (QFF 2008; DeeDi 2010).
some rural communities, especially those 
located in forest areas in southeast Australia, 
are vulnerable to bushfires. loss of property, 
especially homes, is one of the most 
important risks of bushfires, with a major 
factor in the level of risk being the proximity 
of homes and other built infrastructure 
to bushland (Chen and McAneney 2010). 
infrastructure such as powerlines and 
roads can also be damaged in bushfires. For 
example, in the 2003 alpine fires in Victoria, 
about 4500 km of roads were damaged 
and local businesses reported a 50-100% 
economic downturn in the aftermath of the 
fire (stephenson 2010). Bushfires also cause 
high incidence of trauma and long-term 
disruptions to social systems.
livestock losses were estimated at 13,000 in 
the 2003 alpine fires in Victoria, 65,000 in 
the 2005-06 Grampians fire, and more than 
11,000 in the Black saturday fires of 2009 
(stephenson 2010; Teague et al. 2010). stock 
that survive often face starvation or attacks 
from predators due to loss of fencing; over 
8000 km of fences were lost in the Black 
saturday fires (stephenson 2010).
The impacts of climate change on 
agriculture often result in serious 
consequences for health and societal 
well-being in rural Australia. During the 
Millennium Drought (Figure 31) many rural 
communities suffered losses of employment, 
household income, local businesses, 
services, recreational opportunities and 
social cohesion (van Dijk et al. 2013). For 
example, it is estimated that employment 
was reduced by 3% in the Murray river 
region and from 2006 to 2009 about 6000 
jobs were lost (horridge et al. 2005; Wittwer 
and Griffith 2011). 
As noted in the health section, the direct 
impacts of climate change on livelihoods 
and the indirect effects on social services 
and cohesion in rural communities can have 
profound effects on the mental health of 
those struggling to cope with the impacts. A 
study in new south Wales found that during 
drought the relative risk of suicide can 
increase by up to 15% for rural males aged 
30-49 as the severity of drought increases 
(hanigan et al. 2012).
Figure 31: Cattle in fields near Wagga Wagga nsW during the Millennium Drought.
in terrestrial and freshwater environments, 
negative impacts of extreme heat, drying, 
and changes in bushfire patterns are already 
evident. While the impacts of extreme heat on 
human health have attracted much attention 
(section 3.1), heatwaves can also have 
profound effects on plants and animals. The 
January 2009 heatwave in Western Australia, 
when air temperatures reached over 45°C on 
several consecutive days, caused the deaths 
of thousands of birds, mostly zebra finches 
and budgerigars (Mckechnie et al. 2012). 
An extreme heat event in January 2010, 
when temperatures rose to 48°C, caused 
the deaths of over 200 of the endangered 
Carnaby’s Black Cockatoo near hopetoun, 
WA (saunders et al. 2011). since 1994, more 
than 100,000 flying foxes are estimated 
to have died in heatwaves along the east 
coast of Australia. on 12 January 2002, for 
example, over 3,500 flying foxes were killed 
in nine colonies along the nsW coast when 
temperatures exceeded 42°C (Welbergen et 
al. 2008; Figure 32). heatwaves, combined 
with extended droughts, have been observed 
to cause mass mortality in koalas (Gordon et 
al. 1998). other tree-dwelling marsupials are 
also vulnerable. The green ringtail possum, 
for example, (Figure 33), which is restricted 
to rainforests above 300 m in Queensland’s 
Wet Tropics, is unable to control its body 
temperature if subjected to air temperatures 
greater than 30°C for five hours per day over 
four-six days (krockenberger et al. 2012).
Australia is one of the most 
biologically diverse countries in 
the world. Our ecosystems are 
already subject to considerable 
stresses, including habitat loss 
and degradation, pests and weeds, 
over-allocation of river flows, over-
harvesting of commercial species, 
and pollution. Climate change is 
interacting with, and in many cases 
exacerbating, these existing threats 
(Steffen et al. 2009; Reisinger et al. 
2014). Even relatively modest future 
warming (~1°C) has the potential for 
negative effects on many Australian 
species and ecosystems (Hughes 
2011; VanDerWal et al. 2012).
Many species are proving to be highly 
sensitive to the climatic changes of the 
past few decades. observed effects include 
changes in the timing of bird migrations 
(Chambers et al. 2013; Beaumont et al. 2015) 
and the emergence of butterflies (kearney et 
al. 2010), shifts in the balance between warm-
adapted and cold-adapted species (Chessman 
2009), and changes in population sizes and 
geographic distributions within ecological 
communities (last et al. 2011). As warming 
and other climatic changes continue, we also 
expect to see ongoing changes to traditional 
partnerships and interactions between 
species, causing changes in the structure 
and composition of ecological communities 
and the services these communities provide 
(steffen et al. 2009). 
3.6. Climate Change and  
 Natural Ecosystems 
The timing of bird migration, emergence 
of butterflies and flowering is changing.
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Figure 32 (left): Flying foxes suffer high mortality rates during heatwaves. Figure 33 (right): The green ringtail possum is unable to control its body 
temperature when exposed to temperatures above 30°C for long periods of time, making it at risk during extended periods of hot weather.
Changes in fire regimes – the intensity, 
timing and frequency of fires – can cause 
major shifts in ecosystems from one state to 
another. For example, in the mountainous 
areas of the southeast, dense forests could 
be converted to open woodlands if the 
interval between severe fires is reduced 
due to a hotter and drier climate (Williams 
et al. 2009), as appears likely. For example, 
after successive fires in 2003 and 2006/7 in 
Victoria, Acacia shrublands replaced some 
mountain and alpine ash forests because 
there was insufficient time between fires 
for the ash trees to become reproductively 
mature (lindenmayer et al. 2011; Bowman 
et al. 2013b). in the northern Territory, 
changes in fire regimes are associated with 
the expansion of monsoon rainforest into 
eucalypt savanna and grasslands (Bowman 
et al. 2010). 
Drought can also have severe impacts on 
terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems. 
observed drought-related impacts over the 
past decade include mortality of amphibians 
in southeast Australia (Mac nally et al. 
2009), savanna trees in northeast Australia 
(Fensham et al. 2009; Allen et al. 2010) and 
eucalypts in sub-alpine regions in Tasmania 
(Calder and kirkpatrick 2008). During the 
Millennium Drought, flows into the Murray-
Darling system upstream of the Coorong 
were the lowest on record (Csiro 2010), 
causing extreme levels of salinity that 
threatened the viability of many plants and 
animals in the wetlands (leblanc et al. 2012).
While climate change is affecting all 
Australian ecosystems, our alpine species 
and communities are amongst the most 
vulnerable. Alpine habitat only occupies 
about 0.15% of the Australian land surface, 
but is home to many species found nowhere 
else (hughes 2011). The Australian Alps have 
been warming by about 0.2°C per decade 
over the past 35 years (hennessy et al. 2003), 
and snow cover has declined by about a 
third since the 1950s (nicholls 2005). Many 
endemic alpine species, already considered 
rare and threatened, face an uncertain 
future, not just from the loss of snow 
cover, but also from increased frequency 
of bushfires, invasion of low elevation 
species - both native and exotic - to higher 
altitudes, expansion of woody vegetation into 
herbfields, drying of alpine fens and bogs, 
and changes to ecological interactions such 
as those between predators and their prey 
(Pickering et al. 2004; hughes 2011). 
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Australia’s marine ecosystems, considered 
hotspots of global marine biodiversity with 
many rare, endemic, and commercially 
important species, are also undergoing 
considerable change. The waters around 
the Australian coast are warming rapidly 
(section 2.1) especially in the southeast 
where the east Australian Current has 
shifted hundreds of kilometres southwards 
over the past few decades (kelly et al. 2015). 
oceans globally are also becoming more 
acidic from the dissolution of atmospheric 
Co2 into seawater (howard et al. 2012; Figure 
32). recent analyses have concluded that 
under the current rate of emissions, most 
marine organisms will have a very high 
risk of serious impacts from warming and 
increasing acidity this century, and many are 
threatened even under the lowest emissions 
scenario (Gattuso et al. 2015). 
There is probably no better-known 
Australian marine ecosystem than the Great 
Barrier reef (GBr). The reef is not faring well. 
over the past 30 years the GBr has lost 50% 
of its coral cover due to multiple climate and 
non-climate related stresses – death by a 
thousand cuts (De’ath et al. 2012). some of 
these stresses are directly related to climate 
change. Bleaching events (Figure 36) have 
occurred repeatedly on the GBr since the 
late 1970s, while none were observed before 
this time. This problem is also appearing 
on coral reefs elsewhere; the 2011 marine 
heatwave in Western Australia caused the 
first-ever reported bleaching of ningaloo reef 
(Wernberg et al. 2013; Figure 35). Coral reefs 
are also at risk from the increasing acidity 
of ocean waters which reduces calcification 
rates of corals and many other marine 
organisms, making it more difficult for them 
to recover from other stresses (Cooper et al. 
2008; De’ath et al. 2009; Figure 34). other 
threats to reefs include the projected increase 
in intense tropical cyclone activity. in 
2011, Cyclone Yasi, one of the most intense 
tropical storms ever recorded in Queensland 
(Callaghan and Power 2011), caused 
extensive damage, with impacts over an area 
of nearly 90,000 km2 of the Great Barrier reef 
Marine Park. An estimated 15% of the total 
reef area suffered damage, with 6% severely 
affected (GBrMPA 2011). sea level rise, which 
favours fast-growing over slower-growing 
species, poses another threat to some reefs 
(hoegh-Guldberg 2011; Woodroffe and 
Webster 2014) and new diseases of corals are 
emerging, associated with warming waters, 
including white syndrome (since 1998) 
and black band disease (since 1993 – 1994) 
(Bruno et al. 2007; sato et al. 2009; Dalton et 
al. 2010).
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Figure 35: satellite image of an underwater heatwave, 2011. The hottest areas are shown in pink. Source: noAA; Climate 
Commission 2013.
Figure 34: The chemistry of ocean acidification. Source: The Climate Commission 2013.
CO2
CO2
CO2
CO2 CO2 CO2
Atmospheric
CO2 CO2 CO2
Dissolved CO2 + Water  
Hydrogen ions
Carbonate ions
Carbonic Acid
Carbon dioxide readily dissolves in seawater 
forming carbonic acid, which releases a 
hydrogen ion and bicarbonate ion.
The additional hydrogen ions make the ocean more 
acidic and some react with carbonate ions to produce 
more bicarbonate ions. This reaction reduces the 
amount of carbonate ions.
A reduction in carbonate ions is a major threat to 
marine organisms that build shells and exoskeletons 
out of calcium carbonate.
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Figure 36: Coral reefs are very vulnerable to bleaching as the oceans warms.
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Climate change is likely to 
greatly increase the rate of 
species extinction.
Climate change is affecting marine 
organisms in many other ways. Many fish 
species, as well as invertebrates and plants 
such as kelp, are now being observed at more 
southerly sites, shifting their distributions 
as the oceans warm (Pitt et al. 2010; last 
et al. 2011). The long-spined sea urchin 
Centrostephanus rodgersii, formerly only 
known from the nsW coast, has established 
in Tasmania, where it is having major 
negative impacts on marine communities 
and the lobster fishery because it is denuding 
kelp habitats (ling et al. 2008).
Marine turtles are threatened by rising sea 
levels that can inundate nesting sites, and by 
warming which can affect the development 
of hatchlings (e.g. Fuentes et al. 2010). 
extreme heat events also expose plants and 
animals in shallow waters and intertidal 
systems to stress, causing mortality and 
reducing reproduction (Cardoso et al. 2008; 
Garrabou et al. 2009). Coastal habitats, such 
as seagrass, saltmarsh and mangroves, also 
face increasing stress. Changes to coastal 
rainfall patterns affect the flows of nutrients 
and sediments to these habitats, while 
sea-level rise combined with urban and 
agricultural development is “squeezing” the 
area available and reducing the capacity of 
these communities to adapt. Degradation 
and reduction of these habits has important 
implications for the important ecosystem 
services they provide, including coastal 
protection, carbon storage and nursery 
grounds for fish (reisinger et al 2014). 
Finally, of most concern, climate change is 
likely to greatly increase the rate of species 
extinction, both in Australia and globally. 
The most comprehensive study to date has 
estimated that a global average warming 
of 2°C (compared to pre-industrial levels) 
could risk the loss of about 5% of the world’s 
species. if global temperatures reach 3°C 
above pre-industrial levels, 8.5% of species 
are estimated to be at risk, and under 
a “business as usual” (high emissions) 
scenario, leading to global warming of 4°C, a 
staggering 16% (1 in 6) of species could be lost 
(Urban 2015). 
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The research described in the 
sections above is part of an 
enormous body of evidence that 
climate change is already having 
negative impacts on almost every 
aspect of human society, as well as 
the environment that supports us 
(IPCC 2014). 
research such as this is crucial to inform 
the magnitude of the effort required to 
stabilise the climate system at a global 
average temperature that keeps these risks to 
a tolerable level. Based on this research, 195 
countries, including Australia, have agreed 
to limit the human-driven increase in global 
average temperature to no more than 2°C 
above the pre-industrial level (UnFCCC 2010), 
although a limit of 1.5°C is more consistent 
with our current understanding.
The intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (iPCC) has developed the “reasons 
for concern” approach (smith et al. 2001) to 
synthesise and communicate the observed 
and projected impacts of climate change 
at various levels of temperature rise. This 
approach, often illustrated by a graphic called 
the “burning embers diagram”, is based on a 
small number of broad areas where climate 
change is either already driving observable 
impacts or is projected to pose major risks for 
human well-being (Figure 37).
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Figure 37: risks from climate change by reason for concern (rFC) for 2001 compared with the updated data for 2009 and 
for 2014. Climate change consequences are plotted against increases in global mean temperature (GMT) (°C) after 1990. 
each column corresponds to a specific rFC and represents additional outcomes associated with increasing global mean 
temperature. The colour scheme represents progressively increasing levels of risk. The historic period 1900 to 2000 warmed 
by about 0.6°C, which led to some impacts. (A) rFCs adapted from the iPCC Third Assessment report as described in smith 
et al. (2001); (B) Updated rFCs adapted from iPCC Fourth Assessment report as discussed in smith et al. (2009); (C) Updated 
rFCs adapted from the iPCC Fifth Assessment report (iPCC 2014). Source: Climate Council 2015a.
60
The reasons for concern include (i) extreme 
weather events, where the influence of 
climate change is already apparent (iPCC 
2012, 2013), (ii) the risks to unique and 
threatened ecosystems, (iii) the local and 
regional distribution of impacts (e.g., 
showing relatively larger impacts on 
disadvantaged communities and countries), 
(iv) the aggregation of impacts to the scale of 
the global economy and earth’s biodiversity, 
and (v) the risk of crossing thresholds or 
tipping points in large-scale features of 
the climate system, called “large-scale 
discontinuities” in the figure. The figure is 
coloured from white through yellow to red, 
where increasing red tones denote increasing 
risk of damaging impacts. The three panels 
of the figure represent assessment of impacts 
or risk at three different times – 2001 (iPCC 
Third Assessment report; smith et al. 2001), 
2007 (iPCC Fourth Assessment report;  
smith et al. 2009) and 2014 (iPCC Fifth 
Assessment report 2014). The 2°C policy 
target is shown as a horizontal line, 
referenced to the pre-industrial estimate  
of global average temperature.
The figure clearly shows that as the science 
improves, our assessment of risk changes. 
The enhanced knowledge base includes 
observations of actual impacts at the current 
temperature rise of about 0.85°C above pre-
industrial, as well as improved modelling 
capability to project future impacts. For 
example, in 2001 the expected risk of 
increasing extreme weather with a rise of 
between 1 and 2°C in global temperature 
was considered moderate. Today the risk 
is considered high. risks to unique and 
threatened ecosystems, like coral reefs, at 1 to 
2°C of warming were considered moderate 
in 2001. Today the risk is high. Globally 
aggregated impacts were estimated at the low 
end of the risk scale in 2001 whereas they are 
now assessed as the moderate risk level. in 
2001 the risk of crossing tipping points was 
considered negligible up to a temperature 
rise of 3°C and a high risk did not appear until 
above 4°C. The 2014 assessment suggests 
that a moderate risk of crossing large-scale 
tipping points exists in the 1.5-2°C range 
and a very high risk in the 3-4°C range. in 
summary, Figure 37 shows that the scientific 
underpinning for the 2°C policy target as a 
“safe” level of climate change is now weaker 
than it was a decade ago, and the scientific 
case for the 1.5°C limit is more consistent 
with our current level of understanding. 
As noted above, at a 2°C temperature rise 
above pre-industrial we are now closer to 
the risk of crossing thresholds or tipping 
points, which are large features of the climate 
system prone to abrupt and/or irreversible 
change when a critical threshold level of 
temperature rise is reached. examples 
include loss of the Greenland ice sheet, the 
partial conversion of the Amazon rainforest 
to a savanna or grassland, and the large-
scale emission of carbon dioxide (Co2) and 
methane from thawing permafrost. each of 
these examples would cause very significant 
disruptions to the climate system, with 
knock-on effects for human societies. 
The melting of the Greenland ice sheet would 
eventually raise sea level by approximately 
7 metres (Church et al. 2013), committing 
humanity to continuously rising sea levels 
for centuries or millennia, devastating major 
coastal cities worldwide as their limits to 
adapt to coastal flooding were exceeded. The 
tipping point for the Greenland ice sheet is 
estimated to lie within a temperature rise of 
1°C and 4°C above pre-industrial (Church et 
al. 2013). At the current rise in global average 
temperature of 0.85°C above pre-industrial 
levels, there are already early warning signs 
that a tipping point could be crossed this 
century. The average rate of ice loss from 
Greenland has accelerated over the past few 
decades, rising from 34 Gt per year in the 
1992-2001 period to 215 Gt per year in the 
2002-2011 period (stocker et al. 2013; Figure 9).
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There is no consensus yet on where the 
tipping point might lie for large-scale release 
of carbon from permafrost in the northern 
high latitudes (e.g., siberia, Alaska), but the 
potential for such releases to accelerate 
climate change have recently been estimated. 
The potential emissions of Co2 and methane 
from melting permafrost are assessed to 
be in the range of 50 to 250 billion tonnes 
of carbon over the 21st century under the 
highest emissions scenario (Ciais et al. 2013). 
By comparison, current human emissions of 
carbon averaged about 10 billion tonnes per 
year over the most recent decade (le Quéré et 
al. 2014), so the high-end estimate of possible 
carbon emissions from thawing permafrost 
is equivalent to 25 years of human emissions 
at current rates.
in summary, the more we know about climate 
change, the riskier it looks. This conclusion 
(i) underscores the urgency in stabilising 
the climate system as soon as possible 
to minimise the high-end risks; and (ii) 
emphasises the need to dramatically reduce 
Co2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion. 
62
5. noW is The 
TiMe For 
sTronG 
ACTion on 
CliMATe 
ChAnGe
chapter 05 
Now is the time for stroNg actioN oN climate chaNge 
The science of climate change 
is more strongly grounded than 
ever. There is no doubt that the 
climate is changing rapidly and that 
human emissions of greenhouse 
gases, primarily from the burning 
of fossil fuels, are the main cause. 
As research progresses and 
strengthens, the risks of climate 
change for our well-being now 
look more serious at lower levels of 
climate change. 
We face a clear, urgent choice. The climate 
our children and grandchildren will 
experience through their lives depends 
on how much and how fast we reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions now, and in 
the coming years and decades. The two 
possible futures resulting from low and high 
emissions scenarios are vastly different, as 
shown in Figures 12, 13 and 14, described in 
section 3, and summarised in Figure 37.  
The low emissions future is one where 
climate change, though significant, is slowed 
and then stabilised in the second half of the 
century. The high emissions future is one 
of escalating risks, increasingly damaging 
impacts, and a climate system that is 
changing even more rapidly through the rest 
of the century and beyond, perhaps out of 
human control. The longer we delay action, 
the more difficult it becomes to implement 
the low emissions scenario.
The task we face in meeting the 2°C policy 
target is most clearly laid out in the carbon 
budget approach (cf. Climate Council 2015a).  
The carbon budget is defined as the 
maximum amount of Co2 from human 
sources that can be released into the 
atmosphere to limit warming to no more 
than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. That 
is, the carbon budget is the amount of 
Co2 that humanity can “spend”. once the 
carbon budget is spent, global emissions 
of Co2 must be zero; the global economy 
must be completely decarbonised. Table 
7 shows the remaining carbon budget for 
three probabilities of meeting the 2°C policy 
target. The higher the probability we want of 
preventing a global temperature rise of 2°C, 
the more stringent the budget.
A recent economic analysis (McGlade and 
ekins 2015), under the most generous 
assumptions for fossil fuel usage (which 
give only a 50:50 chance of meeting the 2°C 
target), estimates that 38%, at most, of the 
world’s reserves can be burned (“reserves” 
are the subset of resources that are defined 
to be recoverable under current economic 
conditions and have a specific probability of 
being produced). The amount of fossil fuel 
reserves that can be burned is reduced if we 
want a better-than-even chance of limiting 
the rise in global temperature to no more 
than 2°C. For a 75% chance of meeting this 
target, this allowance reduces substantially 
to only 23% of reserves. That is, 77% of the 
world’s fossil fuel reserves cannot be burned. 
The conclusion is clear: under any set of 
assumptions, effectively tackling climate 
change requires that most of the world’s 
fossil fuels be left in the ground, unburned.
Table 7: The carbon budget for three probabilities of meeting the 2°C warming limit. Sources: iPCC (2013) 
and Meinshausen et al. (2009).
Probability of meeting 2°C 
policy target Budget from 2000 Gt CO2 Budget from 2012 Gt CO2
50% 1440 1112
66% 1338 1010
75% 1000 672
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effectively 
tackling climate 
change requires 
that most of the 
world’s fossil 
fuels be left in 
the ground, 
unburned.
The current reserves of the main types of 
fossil fuels – oil, gas and coal – compared to 
the range of carbon budgets are shown in 
Figure 38 (McGlade and ekins 2015). Based 
on the results of a sophisticated integrated 
assessment model that minimises whole-
energy system costs for an assumed carbon 
budget (Anandarajah et al. 2011), coal is the 
fossil fuel with the greatest proportion that 
cannot be used; 88% of global reserves are 
unburnable. oil is the fossil fuel with the least 
proportion that cannot be used, with 35% of 
reserves unburnable. Just over half – about 
52% - of the known reserves of gas  
are unburnable.
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Figure 38: The combustion Co2 emissions for oil, gas and coal (hard coal and lignite) resources and reserves. The range of 
carbon budgets between 2011 and 2050 that are approximately commensurate with limiting temperature rise to 2°C (870-
1240 Gt Co2) is also shown. Source: Adapted from McGlade and ekins (2015).
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chapter 05 
Now is the time for stroNg actioN oN climate chaNge 
Consistent 
with 2°C?
Annual rate 
of emissions 
reductions
Per capita 
emissions  
(t CO
2
e)
Emissions 
intensity  
(t CO
2
e/ 
GDP PPP) Change on base year
Post-2020 2030 2030 2005 2000 1990
Australia 
(26% by 2030)
no -1.6% 16 198 -26% -19% -20%
Canada no -1.6% 14 190 -30% -18% +6%
EU PossiBle -2.6% 6 104 -34% -33% -40%
Germany nA -2.6% 7 89 -45% -46% -55%
Japan no -2.4% 8 134 -25% -25% -19%
New 
Zealand**
no -0.5% 11 175 -30% -23% -10%
Norway PossiBle -1.5% 4 41 -18% -20% -40%
Excluding 
LULUCF
-1.5% 5 51 -44% -44% -40%
Switzerland PossiBle -4.1% 3 32 -51% -51% -50%
UK nA -5.1% 5 74 -49% -51% -64%
USA PossiBle -2.3% 11 113 -39% -40% -29%
Average (excluding Australia) -2.5% 8 116 -36% -36% -35%
 Not consistent with 2°C
 Green is credible  
 pathways to 2°C exist*
 Worst among developed countries
 Australia in worst three
 Blue is best among developed countries
Notes: nA - not applicable as country is part of the eU and independent assessments of their contribution to the 2°C goal 
have not been undertaken. * Consistent on some assessments - credible pathways to 2°C exist, high probability of avoiding 
2°C requires an acceleration of effort to 2050. ** excluding lUlUCF
Figure 39: Comparison of the emission reduction targets that various countries will take into the Paris CoP meeting later this 
year. Source: The Climate institute 2015.
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The carbon budget has important 
implications for Australia’s fossil fuel 
industry. The McGlade and ekins (2015) 
analysis estimates that under any set of 
assumptions, including the use of Carbon 
Capture and storage (CCs) technology, over 
90% of Australian coal reserves cannot be 
burned. Furthermore, meeting the 2°C policy 
target implies that it is highly unlikely that 
any of Australia’s potential coal resources 
beyond the reserves already being exploited 
could ever be developed.
halfway through the Critical Decade, 
2015 is a pivotal year for global action: the 
international community will converge in 
Paris at the end of the year to negotiate a new 
agreement aiming to limit the increase in 
global average temperature to no more than 
2°C above pre-industrial levels. The window 
for having a realistic chance of meeting this 
policy target is closing rapidly. 
in the lead up to the United nations 
conference in Paris, countries are submitting 
their emissions reduction targets, known 
as intended nationally Determined 
Contributions (inDCs). emissions reduction 
targets are important because they signal the 
commitment of individual countries to tackle 
climate change. Further, by combining all of 
the countries’ emissions reduction targets, a 
more complete picture can be developed of 
how the world is (or is not) tracking towards 
limiting global warming to 2°C (cf. Climate 
Council 2015b).
Figure 39 shows how Australia’s inDC 
stacks up against those of other countries, 
and how all of the countries’ pledges rate 
in terms of the 2°C policy target. it is clear 
that Australia is lagging well behind the rest 
of the developed world in climate action; 
in any indicator used to measure level of 
effort, Australia is at the bottom or within 
the bottom three countries in the developed 
world. our target of a 26% emission reduction 
by 2030 on a 2005 base year is much lower 
than comparable targets of 41% for the UsA, 
46% for Germany, 48% for the Uk and 34% 
for the eU as a whole. our target is not even 
close to what is required for Australia to do 
our fair share in meeting the 2°C policy 
target. in fact, if the entire world made an 
effort similar to Australia’s, we would be 
heading for a warming of 3-4°C above pre-
industrial (The Climate institute 2015). 
it is in Australia’s national interest to play a 
strong role in this agreement because we are 
on the front line of climate change impacts 
and are one of the world’s largest emitters of 
greenhouse gases. our response to meeting 
the challenge of Paris is disappointingly 
weak; it is out of step with the science 
and out of step with most countries in the 
developed world. now is the time to lift our 
game. We need much stronger action and we 
should be helping to lead the way.
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